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arXiv 2401.05683cs.GTcs.AI
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深度学习与机制设计的结合:关键结果与一些新应用

Deep Learning Meets Mechanism Design: Key Results and Some Novel Applications

Department of Electronics and Communication Engineering, SRM University A.P.(电子与通信工程系,SRM大学);Carnegie Mellon University(卡内基梅隆大学);Plaksha University(Plaksha大学);Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science(计算机科学与自动化系,印度科学研究院)

V. Udaya Sankar, Vishisht Srihari Rao, Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Y. Narahari

AI总结:

本文探讨了深度学习在机制设计中的应用,通过三个案例研究展示了如何利用深度学习近似满足机制设计中的关键属性。

摘要:

机制设计本质上是逆向工程游戏,涉及以某种方式诱导战略代理之间的游戏,使得诱导的游戏在均衡中满足一组期望的属性。机制的可取属性包括激励相容性、个体理性、福利最大化、收益最大化(或成本最小化)、分配的公平性等。根据机制设计理论,只有某些严格子集的这些属性可以同时被任何给定的机制精确满足。往往,现实世界应用所需的机制可能需要一个理论上不可能同时满足的属性子集。在这种情况下,一个突出的近期方法是使用基于深度学习的方法来学习一个机制,通过最小化适当定义的损失函数,近似满足所需属性。在本文中,我们从相关文献中呈现了使用深度学习方法进行机制设计的技术细节,并概述了该主题的关键结果。我们通过三个示例案例研究展示了这种方法的威力:(a)车载网络中的高效能源管理(b)移动网络中的资源分配(c)设计农业投入的体积折扣采购拍卖。第六节总结了本文。

英文摘要:

Mechanism design is essentially reverse engineering of games and involves inducing a game among strategic agents in a way that the induced game satisfies a set of desired properties in an equilibrium of the game. Desirable properties for a mechanism include incentive compatibility, individual rationality, welfare maximisation, revenue maximisation (or cost minimisation), fairness of allocation, etc. It is known from mechanism design theory that only certain strict subsets of these properties can be simultaneously satisfied exactly by any given mechanism. Often, the mechanisms required by real-world applications may need a subset of these properties that are theoretically impossible to be simultaneously satisfied. In such cases, a prominent recent approach is to use a deep learning based approach to learn a mechanism that approximately satisfies the required properties by minimizing a suitably defined loss function. In this paper, we present, from relevant literature, technical details of using a deep learning approach for mechanism design and provide an overview of key results in this topic. We demonstrate the power of this approach for three illustrative case studies: (a) efficient energy management in a vehicular network (b) resource allocation in a mobile network (c) designing a volume discount procurement auction for agricultural inputs. Section 6 concludes the paper.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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