Structural constraints to compare phenomenal experience
Universitat de València(瓦伦西亚大学);Monash University(莫纳什大学);National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT)(信息通信研究机构);ATR Computational Neuroscience Laboratories(ATR计算神经科学实验室);University of Oxford(牛津大学);University of Copenhagen(哥本哈根大学);Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)(布鲁塞尔自由大学)
This article defines a partial order structure to study the relationship between levels and contents of conscious subjective experience in a single mathematical set-up. We understand phenomenal structure as extrapolated relationships among experiences, instead of fixed properties of specific experiences. Our mathematical account is based on multilayer network theory. Multilayer theory is a generalization of graph and network theory, widely used in several scientific domains. This structure is also the underlying conceptual and mathematical structure of most current models of conscious experience. From our simple set of assumptions, yet rigorous analysis, we conclude that assuming the comparison and quantification among phenomenal experiences yield only partial comparison, rather than commonly assumed absolute comparability. This has implications for evolutionary and animal consciousness: evolution may encompass diverse modes of experiencing, not necessarily implying larger ones on an absolute scale. Our characterization elucidates structural constraints on experiential comparisons imposed by assumptions and choices made by modellers as active participants in the scientific process. In summary, in light of our phenomenological intuitions, it might be right that some experiences carry qualitative aspects that make them incompatible or non-comparable with other experiences, quantitatively speaking. Some experiences are comparable (e.g. at some experiential levels), but others are not. These results have direct implications for consciousness science, evolution and animal consciousness.
The Complex Brain Hypothesis: Resolving the Entropy-Content Conundrum in Minimal Phenomenal Experience
McGill University(麦吉尔大学);University of Oxford(牛津大学);Universitat Pompeu Fabra(庞培法布拉大学);Jewish General Hospital(犹太总医院);University of California San Francisco(加州大学旧金山分校);Imperial College London(伦敦帝国理工学院);University College London(伦敦大学学院)
The Rosetta Stone and Levels of Principled Inference to the Experience of Another Mind
Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Faculty of Philosophy, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin(柏林大学哲学学院心智与脑学院);Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison(威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校精神病学系);School of Psychological Sciences, Faculty of Medicine, Nursing and Health Science, Monash University(蒙纳士大学医学、护理与健康科学学院心理科学学院);Advanced Telecommunications Research Computational Neuroscience Laboratories(先进电信研究计算神经科学实验室);Turner Institute for Brain and Mental Health, Faculty of Medicine, Nursing and Health Science(蒙纳士大学医学、护理与健康学院特纳脑与心理健康研究所);Center for Information and Neural Networks (CiNet), National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT)(信息通信技术研究所信息与神经网络中心);Theoretical Sciences Visiting Program (TSVP), Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology Graduate University(冲绳科学技术大学院大学理论科学访问项目)