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arXiv 1108.4296q-bio.NC
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论现象意识的演化

On the evolution of phenomenal consciousness

Jean-Louis Dessalles, Tiziana Zalla

摘要:

“意识”一词包括许多概念。在这里,我们选择专注于现象意识,通过这个过程,我们能够体验我们的环境或我们的物理状态的各个方面。我们可能与许多动物共享这方面的意识,这些动物和我们一样,感受痛苦或快乐,体验颜色,声音,味道等。由于现象意识是某些生物物种的特征,我们应该能够用自然选择来解释它。它是一种适应功能,还是一种附带现象?我们将给出论据来拒绝第二种选择。我们认为,意识的现象属性参与了一个标签过程,使我们能够区分和评估心理表征。我们还讨论了在多大程度上意识本身已被选择为这种标签功能。

英文摘要:

A number of concepts are included in the term 'consciousness'. We choose to concentrate here on phenomenal consciousness, the process through which we are able to experience aspects of our environment or of our physical state. We probably share this aspect of consciousness with many animals which, like us, feel pain or pleasure and experience colours, sounds, flavours, etc. Since phenomenal consciousness is a feature of some living species, we should be able to account for it in terms of natural selection. Does it have an adaptive function, or is it an epiphenomenon ? We shall give arguments to reject the second alternative. We propose that phenomenal properties of consciousness are involved in a labelling process that allows us to discriminate and to evaluate mental representations. We also discuss to what extent consciousness as such has been selected for this labelling function.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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