罗塞塔石碑与对他人心智体验的原则性推理层级
The Rosetta Stone and Levels of Principled Inference to the Experience of Another Mind
AI总结：
本文考察感受质结构范式与整合信息理论两种结构方法，虽无法解决他心问题，但能提供可比较心智的形式媒介，为推理提供原则性约束，缩小亲知鸿沟。
AI中文摘要：
他心问题这一经典难题已困扰哲学家数千年，核心是我们是否有任何方式真正理解他人的心智体验。我们通过亲知（acquaintance）知晓自身的内在体验，却只能期望获得对他人体验的外在描述，二者被亲知鸿沟分隔。结构方法旨在用数学结构表征体验，并有望提供一块“罗塞塔石碑”，即一种将体验内容转化为数学结构的原则性方法。本章中，我们考察了两种此类方法——感受质结构范式（Qualia Structure Paradigm, Qstr）与整合信息理论（Integrated Information Theory, IIT），以探究若它们拥有所追寻的罗塞塔石碑，能让我们对他人心智做出何种（若有的话）推理。Qstr 以跨现象的方式展开，旨在通过某一体验与所有其他体验的关系详尽表征该体验，并为体验的同一性提供必要条件；IIT 则以跨现象的方式展开，推测单一体验由某一基质在特定状态下展开的因果结构所解释，该解释性同一性是体验同一性的充分必要条件。尽管两种方法均无法跨越亲知鸿沟抵达他人心智，但它们提供了一种可用于比较心智的共同形式媒介，进而缩小这一鸿沟。我们将推理强度与范畴论（Category Theory）中的结构对应层级关联起来，这些层级从同构（isomorphism）经强伴随、弱伴随，直至推理失效的原则性极限。我们得出结论：这些结构方法及其各自罗塞塔石碑的存在，不会解决他心问题，而是为我们可做的推理提供一套原则性约束，其意义远超此前可被证明合理的范畴。
英文摘要：
The classical problem of Other Minds has dogged philosophers for millennia; asking if we have any way to truly understand the experience of another mind. We know our own intrinsic experience by acquaintance, but can only ever hope to possess an extrinsic description of another's, with the two separated by an acquaintance gap. Structural approaches aim to characterise experience in terms of a mathematical structure, and promise a 'Rosetta Stone'; that is, a principled method to translate the contents of experience into a mathematical structure. In this chapter, we examine two such approaches - the Qualia Structure Paradigm (Qstr) and Integrated Information Theory (IIT) - to ask what, if anything, they allow us to infer about another mind should they possess the Rosetta Stone they seek. Qstr proceeds inter-phenomenally; aiming to exhaustively characterise an experience by its relations to all other experiences and providing a necessary condition on the sameness of experience. IIT proceeds intra-phenomenally; conjecturing that a single experience is accounted for by the cause-effect structure unfolded from a substrate in a state, an explanatory identity that is both necessary and sufficient for the sameness of experience. While neither approach can cross the acquaintance gap to another's mind, they provide a common formal medium through which minds may be compared and in turn reduce the size of this gap. We identify the strength of inference with levels of structural correspondence in Category Theory. These descend from isomorphism through strong and weak adjunction, to a principled limit where inference runs out. We conclude that these structural approaches and the existence of their respective Rosetta Stones would not solve the problem of Other Minds, but instead provide a system of principled constraints on what we may infer, which is far more than what has been justifiable before.
