Hebrew University of Jerusalem(耶路撒冷希伯来大学);University of Toronto(多伦多大学);Schwartz Reisman Institute for Technology and Society(施瓦茨·里斯曼技术与社会研究所);Institute for Law & AI(法律与人工智能研究所)
The field of AI is undergoing a fundamental transition from generative models that can produce synthetic content to artificial agents that can plan and execute complex tasks with only limited human involvement. Companies that pioneered the development of language models have now built AI agents that can independently navigate the internet, perform a wide range of online tasks, and increasingly serve as AI personal assistants and virtual coworkers. The opportunities presented by this new technology are tremendous, as are the associated risks. Fortunately, there exist robust analytic frameworks for confronting many of these challenges, namely, the economic theory of principal-agent problems and the common law doctrine of agency relationships. Drawing on these frameworks, this Article makes three contributions. First, it uses agency law and theory to identify and characterize problems arising from AI agents, including issues of information asymmetry, discretionary authority, and loyalty. Second, it illustrates the limitations of conventional solutions to agency problems: incentive design, monitoring, and enforcement might not be effective for governing AI agents that make uninterpretable decisions and operate at unprecedented speed and scale. Third, the Article explores the implications of agency law and theory for designing and regulating AI agents, arguing that new technical and legal infrastructure is needed to support governance principles of inclusivity, visibility, and liability.
Active Inference: A method for Phenotyping Agency in AI systems?
Independent Researcher Laboratoire d'Analyse Cognitive de l'Information, Universit\' e du Qu\' e bec \` a Montr\' e al, Qu\' e bec, Canada Centre of Excellence for AI;Robotics, Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, UK Methods;Statistical Computing, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive;Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany Department of Computer Science, School of Physics, Engineering;Computer Science, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, UK Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK Department of Engineering;Informatics, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, BN1 9RH, UK
See, Hypothesize, Validate: Multimodal Agentic Framework for Discovering Governing PDEs
Indian Institute of Technology Delhi(印度德里理工学院);Robert Bosch GmbH(罗伯特·博世有限公司);TCS Research(塔塔咨询服务公司研究院);Yardi School of Artificial Intelligence (ScAI)(亚迪人工智能学院);Department of Applied Mechanics(应用力学系)
From Assistance to Agency: Rethinking Autonomy and Control in CI/CD Pipelines
Faculty of Information University of Toronto Toronto Ontario Canada(信息学院多伦多大学多伦多安大略加拿大);Department of Computer Science Trent University Peterborough Ontario Canada(计算机科学系特伦特大学彼得伯格安大略加拿大);University of Toronto(多伦多大学);Trent University(特伦特大学)
Towards Governing Agent's Efficacy: Action-Conditional $β$-VAE for Deep Transparent Reinforcement Learning
Seoul National University(首尔国立大学);Samsung Electronics(三星电子)
我们在强化学习(RL)的设置中解决了深度神经网络的黑盒问题,其中神经代理以不可控的方式学习最大化奖励收益。当交互环境包括广阔的状态空间时,这种学习方法是有风险的,因为几乎不可能预见所有不想要的结果并预先用负奖励惩罚它们。与以前的作品中学习的神经功能的反向分析不同,我们提出的方法\nj{tackles the blackbox issue by encouraging}是一个RL策略网络,通过实现一个解纠缠的表示学习方法来学习可解释的潜在特征。为此,我们的方法允许RL代理通过将其影响与不可控的环境因素区分开来来理解自我效能,这与人类理解场景的方式非常相似。我们的实验结果表明,学习的潜在因素不仅是可解释的,而且还可以建模整个访问状态空间的分布与特定的动作条件。我们已经实验表明,拟议结构的这一特征可以导致对RL代理的期望行为进行事后治理。
Copenhagen Causality Lab and Pioneer Centre for AI, University of Copenhagen, Denmark(哥本哈根因果实验室和先锋人工智能中心,哥本哈根大学,丹麦);Cooperative AI Foundation, United Kingdom(协作人工智能基金会,英国)