高级人工智能系统的能动性三维类型学
A three-dimensional typology of agency for advanced AI systems
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中文总结 AI 辅助
该研究构建了前沿AI系统能动性的三维类型学,区分法律与道德能动性,为非人类AI的能动性考量提供概念框架,解决AI行为归因复杂化的问题。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
关于高级人工智能(AI)系统能动性的研究,将能动性视为一种规范性概念,且聚焦于具有强能动性的AI系统的能动性。尽管近期研究也关注能动系统的不同特征,但尚无框架能解决高级AI系统所体现的能动性类型问题,尤其在考虑非道德形式的能动性时。基于哲学、伦理学、法律理论和社会学中的既定理论立场,我们构建了面向前沿AI系统的能动性类型学,包含三个维度:能动性的性质(道德或法律)、模式(个体或集体)与场所(人类或非人类)。这些维度结合后产生八种可能的能动性实例,我们将其归类为常规、有争议或具争议性。该类型学区分了法律能动性与道德能动性,从而为考量个体、法律、非人类能动性创造了概念空间,无需预设高级AI系统是道德主体。我们认为,当工具性目标追求使AI行为向特定人类行为者的归因复杂化时,这种区分愈发重要。
英文摘要
Research on the agency of advanced artificial intelligence (AI) systems focuses on agency as a normative concept and on the agency of particularly agentic AI systems. While recent work also focuses on the different profiles of agentic systems, no framework exists to address the question of the type of agency instantiated by advanced AI systems, particularly when considering non-moral forms of agency. Based on established theoretical positions in philosophy, ethics, legal theory and sociology, we develop a typology of agency for frontier AI systems consisting of three dimensions: the nature of agency (moral or legal), its mode (individual or collective) and its locus (human or non-human). Combining these dimensions produces eight possible instantiations of agency, which we classify as conventional, contested or controversial. The typology separates legal from moral agency and thereby creates conceptual space for considering individual, legal, non-human agency without presupposing that advanced AI systems are moral agents. We argue that this distinction is increasingly relevant where instrumental goal pursuit complicates the attribution of AI actions to particular human actors.
发表机构
- Stellenbosch University(斯泰伦博斯大学)
- School for Data Science and Computational Thinking(数据科学与计算思维学院)
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