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arXiv 2405.04525cs.GT
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从认可投票中获取候选排序方式的比较

Comparing Ways of Obtaining Candidate Orderings from Approval Ballots

Théo Delemazure, Chris Dong, Dominik Peters, Magdaléna Tydrichová

AI总结:

本文从社会选择角度公理化比较了5种从认可投票中获取候选排序的轴选择规则,建立不可能性定理并刻画了使区间票数最大化的评分规则,最后在法国选举、美国最高法院及合成数据上验证其行为。

摘要:

为了理解和总结认可偏好及其他二元评价数据,将项目排列在一个能够解释这些数据的轴上是很有用的。在使用认可投票的政治选举中,这可以是一个意识形态上的左-右轴,使得每位投票者认可的候选人在该轴上相邻,类似于单峰性。在一个完美的轴上,每个认可集合都会是一个区间,但这通常不可能实现,因此我们需要选择一个最接近这一理想的轴。已有文献开发了用于优化若干目标函数的算法(例如,最小化为了得到完美轴所需添加的认可数量),但在不同目标之间的选择上提供的帮助很少。本文采用社会选择方法,通过研究它们所满足的性质,从公理化角度比较了5种不同的轴选择规则。我们建立了一些不可能性定理,并在评分规则类内刻画了选择使形成区间的票数最大化的轴的规则,使用了选票单调性和抗克隆公理。最后,我们研究了这些规则在法国选举调查数据、美国最高法院法官投票数据以及合成数据上的行为。

英文摘要:

To understand and summarize approval preferences and other binary evaluation data, it is useful to order the items on an axis which explains the data. In a political election using approval voting, this could be an ideological left-right axis such that each voter approves adjacent candidates, an analogue of single-peakedness. In a perfect axis, every approval set would be an interval, which is usually not possible, and so we need to choose an axis that gets closest to this ideal. The literature has developed algorithms for optimizing several objective functions (e.g., minimize the number of added approvals needed to get a perfect axis), but provides little help with choosing among different objectives. In this paper, we take a social choice approach and compare 5 different axis selection rules axiomatically, by studying the properties they satisfy. We establish some impossibility theorems, and characterize (within the class of scoring rules) the rule that chooses the axes that maximize the number of votes that form intervals, using the axioms of ballot monotonicity and resistance to cloning. Finally, we study the behavior of the rules on data from French election surveys, on the votes of justices of the US Supreme Court, and on synthetic data.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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