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arXiv 2404.14927econ.TH
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具有消费者学习机制的最优退款机制

Optimal Refund Mechanism with Consumer Learning

Qianjun Lyu

AI总结:

本文研究了买方可私下获取产品估值信息时的最优退款机制,发现最优机制为确定性形式:卖方要么提供低价并禁止退货以阻止买方学习,要么提供高价并允许免费退货以实现最大买方学习,且该机制对买方先验信念呈非单调性。

摘要:

本文研究了当不知情的买方可以随时间私下获取产品估值信息时的最优退款机制。我们考虑了一类基于随机退货政策的退款机制:如果买方要求退货,卖方将发出(部分)退款,同时允许买方以一定概率保留产品。此类退货政策可以影响买方的学习过程,从而影响退货率。然而,我们表明最优退款机制是确定性的且形式简单:要么卖方提供足够低的价格并禁止退货以阻止买方学习,要么提供足够高的价格并允许免费退货以实现最大程度的买方学习。最优退款机制的形式对买方关于其估值的先验信念是非单调的。

英文摘要:

This paper studies the optimal refund mechanism when an uninformed buyer can privately acquire information about his valuation of a product over time. We consider a class of refund mechanisms based on stochastic return policies: if the buyer requests a return, the seller will issue a (partial) refund while allowing the buyer to keep the product with some probability. Such return policies can affect the buyer's learning process and thereby influence the return rate. Nevertheless, we show that the optimal refund mechanism is deterministic and takes a simple form: either the seller offers a sufficiently low price and disallows returns to deter buyer learning, or she offers a sufficiently high price with free returns to implement maximal buyer learning. The form of the optimal refund mechanism is non-monotone in the buyer's prior belief regarding his valuation.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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