搜索算法的极限
The Limits of Search Algorithms
AI总结：
本文研究平台搜索算法对市场均衡的影响，引入“契约”类算法刻画可实现价格集合，并识别出卖方最优、消费者最优及社会最优契约，揭示其对价格水平的相反作用。
摘要：
平台承诺一个将价格映射到搜索顺序的搜索算法。给定此算法，卖家设定价格，消费者进行序贯搜索。该框架推广了有序搜索文献。我们引入一类特殊的搜索算法，称为“契约”，证明它们能实现所有可能的均衡价格，随后刻画可实现价格集合。在此集合内，我们识别出卖方最优契约，其第一最优结果对多产品卖家而言仍是开放问题。我们的发现凸显了平台偏好价格分散或价格对称的条件。此外，我们刻画了消费者最优和社会最优契约，它们对卖方最优契约施加相反作用力：卖方最优契约推高价格，而消费者最优和社会最优契约偏好更低价格。
英文摘要：
A platform commits to a search algorithm that maps prices to search order. Given this algorithm, sellers set prices, and consumers engage in sequential search. This framework generalizes the ordered search literature. We introduce a special class of search algorithms, termed ''contracts,'' show that they implement all possible equilibrium prices and then characterize the set of implementable prices. Within this set, we identify the seller-optimal contract, whose first-best outcome remains an open problem for a multiproduct seller. Our findings highlight the conditions under which the platform favors price dispersion or price symmetry. Furthermore, we characterize the consumer-optimal and socially optimal contracts, which exert opposing forces to the seller-optimal contract: while the seller-optimal contract promotes higher prices, the consumer-optimal and socially optimal contracts favor lower prices.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
