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arXiv 2405.05744econ.TH
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设计社会学习

Designing Social Learning

Higher School of Economics(高等经济大学);University of Copenhagen(哥本哈根大学)

Aleksei Smirnov, Egor Starkov

AI总结:

本文研究社会学习中战略沟通问题,分析消费者通过产品评论获取信息时的冲突,提出最优沟通机制应真实传达极端体验并汇总中等体验。

摘要:

本文研究社会学习中的战略沟通问题。消费者通过产品评论获取产品质量信息,但在撰写评论前,消费者必须首先被说服购买该产品。当评论者关心未来消费者的福利时,这会导致冲突:今天的评论者希望即使以自身损失为代价,也要让未来消费者购买该产品,以便为后续消费者揭示更多信息。我们证明,由于这种冲突,通过评论的沟通必然存在噪声,无论评论者是否能承诺采用某种沟通策略,或是否只能依靠廉价言谈。最优的沟通机制涉及真实传达极端体验,并将中等体验汇总在一起。

英文摘要:

This paper studies strategic communication in the context of social learning. Product reviews are used by consumers to learn product quality, but in order to write a review, a consumer must be convinced to purchase the item first. When reviewers care about welfare of future consumers, this leads to a conflict: a reviewer today wants the future consumers to purchase the item even when this comes at a loss to them, so that more information is revealed for the consumers that come after. We show that due to this conflict, communication via reviews is inevitably noisy, regardless of whether reviewers can commit to a communication strategy or have to resort to cheap talk. The optimal communication mechanism involves truthful communication of extreme experiences and pools the moderate experiences together.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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