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arXiv 2310.07014cs.CR
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LeakyOhm:利用阻抗分析提取秘密比特

LeakyOhm: Secret Bits Extraction using Impedance Analysis

Saleh Khalaj Monfared, Tahoura Mosavirik, Shahin Tajik

AI总结:

本文提出一种名为LeakyOhm的新型非侵入式物理侧信道攻击,通过散射参数分析注入高频信号探测芯片寄存器内容引起的阻抗变化,成功破解高阶掩码AES密钥,并探讨了隐藏对策的防御潜力。

摘要:

物理侧信道攻击的威胁及其对策已被广泛研究。大多数物理侧信道攻击依赖于计算或存储对芯片电流消耗或电压降的不可避免影响。这种数据相关的影响可以通过例如功耗分析或电磁分析来利用。在本研究中,我们引入了一种新型非侵入式物理侧信道攻击,它利用芯片阻抗中数据相关的变化。我们的攻击基于这样一个事实:寄存器中临时存储的内容会改变电路的物理特性,从而导致芯片阻抗的变化。为了感知这种阻抗变化,我们采用了一种众所周知的射频/微波方法,称为散射参数分析,在该方法中,我们将高频正弦波信号注入系统的电源分配网络(PDN)并测量信号的回波。我们证明,根据寄存器的内容比特和物理位置,反射信号在不同的频率点被不同地调制,从而能够同时且独立地探测各个寄存器。这种侧信道泄漏挑战了掩码中使用的$t$-探测安全模型假设,而掩码是一种突出的侧信道对策。为了验证我们的主张,我们对无保护和高阶掩码AES的硬件实现实施了非模板化和模板化阻抗分析攻击。我们表明,在模板化攻击的情况下,仅需单条轨迹即可恢复密钥。最后,我们讨论了一类特定的隐藏对策如何可能有效抵御阻抗泄漏。

英文摘要:

The threats of physical side-channel attacks and their countermeasures have been widely researched. Most physical side-channel attacks rely on the unavoidable influence of computation or storage on current consumption or voltage drop on a chip. Such data-dependent influence can be exploited by, for instance, power or electromagnetic analysis. In this work, we introduce a novel non-invasive physical side-channel attack, which exploits the data-dependent changes in the impedance of the chip. Our attack relies on the fact that the temporarily stored contents in registers alter the physical characteristics of the circuit, which results in changes in the die's impedance. To sense such impedance variations, we deploy a well-known RF/microwave method called scattering parameter analysis, in which we inject sine wave signals with high frequencies into the system's power distribution network (PDN) and measure the echo of the signals. We demonstrate that according to the content bits and physical location of a register, the reflected signal is modulated differently at various frequency points enabling the simultaneous and independent probing of individual registers. Such side-channel leakage challenges the $t$-probing security model assumption used in masking, which is a prominent side-channel countermeasure. To validate our claims, we mount non-profiled and profiled impedance analysis attacks on hardware implementations of unprotected and high-order masked AES. We show that in the case of the profiled attack, only a single trace is required to recover the secret key. Finally, we discuss how a specific class of hiding countermeasures might be effective against impedance leakage.

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