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arXiv 2403.10328cs.CR
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冷静与残酷:分离LWE秘密的困难部分

The cool and the cruel: separating hard parts of LWE secrets

Niklas Nolte, Mohamed Malhou, Emily Wenger, Samuel Stevens, Cathy Li, François Charton, Kristin Lauter

AI总结:

针对稀疏二元LWE现有攻击内存需求高的问题,提出低内存统计攻击,利用格基约化后高方差条目集中于前列的特性分离秘密困难部分,先找前列“残酷”比特再线性求剩余“冷静”比特,在多维度下验证有效且对RLWE威胁更大。

摘要:

稀疏二元LWE秘密正被考虑用于全同态加密及其在隐私计算中的应用的标准化。针对稀疏二元LWE秘密的已知攻击包括稀疏对偶攻击,以及需要大量内存的混合稀疏对偶-中间相遇攻击。本文提出了一种内存需求低的新型统计攻击。该攻击依赖于初始的格基约化。核心观察是,对类q元嵌入随机矩阵$\boldsymbol{A}$的行进行格基约化后,高方差的条目集中在提取得到的矩阵的前列。这使得我们能够分离出LWE秘密的“困难部分”。我们可以先求解在前列中找到秘密的“残酷(cruel)”比特的子问题,然后在线性时间内找到剩余的“冷静(cool)”比特。我们使用统计技术区分分布,以识别秘密的残酷比特和冷静比特。我们给出了在维度$n=256$、$512$和$768$下恢复秘密的具体攻击耗时。在格基约化阶段,我们利用了并行应用的格基约化的最新改进(例如flatter)。我们还将这种新攻击应用于2次幂分圆环的RLWE场景,结果表明这些RLWE实例比LWE更容易受到这种攻击。

英文摘要:

Sparse binary LWE secrets are under consideration for standardization for Homomorphic Encryption and its applications to private computation. Known attacks on sparse binary LWE secrets include the sparse dual attack and the hybrid sparse dual-meet in the middle attack which requires significant memory. In this paper, we provide a new statistical attack with low memory requirement. The attack relies on some initial lattice reduction. The key observation is that, after lattice reduction is applied to the rows of a q-ary-like embedded random matrix $\mathbf A$, the entries with high variance are concentrated in the early columns of the extracted matrix. This allows us to separate out the "hard part" of the LWE secret. We can first solve the sub-problem of finding the "cruel" bits of the secret in the early columns, and then find the remaining "cool" bits in linear time. We use statistical techniques to distinguish distributions to identify both the cruel and the cool bits of the secret. We provide concrete attack timings for recovering secrets in dimensions $n=256$, $512$, and $768$. For the lattice reduction stage, we leverage recent improvements in lattice reduction (e.g. flatter) applied in parallel. We also apply our new attack in the RLWE setting for $2$-power cyclotomic rings, showing that these RLWE instances are much more vulnerable to this attack than LWE.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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