基于Rowhammer的LWE密钥封装机制方案的实际密钥恢复攻击
A practical key-recovery attack on LWE-based key-encapsulation mechanism schemes using Rowhammer
AI总结：
本文提出一种基于Rowhammer的微架构端到端攻击方法，针对格基后量子KEM的Fujisaki-Okamoto变换恢复长期密钥，并在Kyber和Saber上验证，同时改进明文检查预言机以减少查询次数。
摘要：
物理攻击是对现实世界中部署的密码系统的严重威胁。在这项工作中，我们提出了一种针对通用格基后量子密钥封装机制的微架构端到端攻击方法，以恢复长期秘密密钥。我们的攻击针对Fujisaki-Okamoto变换中的一个关键组件，该变换几乎用于所有格基密钥封装机制的构造中。我们通过使用Rowhammer在Kyber和Saber等实际方案上演示了我们的攻击模型。我们表明，我们的攻击高度实用，并且对攻击者成功所需的前提条件很少。作为额外贡献，我们提出了一种改进的明文检查预言机版本，该预言机几乎被所有针对格基密钥封装机制的物理攻击策略所使用。我们的改进将Saber的明文检查预言机查询次数减少了多达39%，对于Kyber768则减少了约23%。这可以具有独立的研究价值，并且也可用于降低其他攻击的复杂度。
英文摘要：
Physical attacks are serious threats to cryptosystems deployed in the real world. In this work, we propose a microarchitectural end-to-end attack methodology on generic lattice-based post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms to recover the long-term secret key. Our attack targets a critical component of a Fujisaki-Okamoto transform that is used in the construction of almost all lattice-based key encapsulation mechanisms. We demonstrate our attack model on practical schemes such as Kyber and Saber by using Rowhammer. We show that our attack is highly practical and imposes little preconditions on the attacker to succeed. As an additional contribution, we propose an improved version of the plaintext checking oracle, which is used by almost all physical attack strategies on lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanisms. Our improvement reduces the number of queries to the plaintext checking oracle by as much as $39\%$ for Saber and approximately $23\%$ for Kyber768. This can be of independent interest and can also be used to reduce the complexity of other attacks.
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