NoMod:针对模学习差错问题的非模块化攻击
NoMod: A Non-modular Attack on Module Learning With Errors
AI总结:
针对后量子密码核心问题Module-LWE,提出混合白盒攻击方法NoMod,通过鲁棒线性估计规避模归约难题,在多种参数设置下实现密钥恢复并开源实现。
摘要:
量子计算的出现对经典公钥密码学构成威胁,这推动了NIST(美国国家标准与技术研究院)采纳后量子密码方案,例如基于模学习差错(Module-LWE)问题的方案。我们提出了NoMod ML-Attack,这是一种混合白盒密码分析方法,它将模环绕视为统计损坏,并将密钥恢复问题转化为鲁棒线性估计问题,从而规避了模归约建模的难题。我们的方法结合了优化的格预处理(包括约简向量保存和代数放大),以及通过Tukey's Biweight损失训练的鲁棒估计器。实验表明,NoMod在维度$n=350$时可完全恢复二进制密钥,在$n=256$时可恢复稀疏二项式密钥,在参数为$(n,k)=(128,3)$和$(256,2)$的CRYSTALS-Kyber设置中也能成功恢复稀疏密钥。我们在匿名仓库https://anonymous.4open.science/r/NoMod-3BD4 中发布了我们的实现代码。
英文摘要:
The advent of quantum computing threatens classical public-key cryptography, motivating NIST's adoption of post-quantum schemes such as those based on the Module Learning With Errors (Module-LWE) problem. We present NoMod ML-Attack, a hybrid white-box cryptanalytic method that circumvents the challenge of modeling modular reduction by treating wrap-arounds as statistical corruption and casting secret recovery as robust linear estimation. Our approach combines optimized lattice preprocessing--including reduced-vector saving and algebraic amplification--with robust estimators trained via Tukey's Biweight loss. Experiments show NoMod achieves full recovery of binary secrets for dimension $n = 350$, recovery of sparse binomial secrets for $n = 256$, and successful recovery of sparse secrets in CRYSTALS-Kyber settings with parameters $(n, k) = (128, 3)$ and $(256, 2)$. We release our implementation in an anonymous repository https://anonymous.4open.science/r/NoMod-3BD4.
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