arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2302.08012cs.GTcs.AI
收藏

具有外部性的数据市场均衡

Equilibrium of Data Markets with Externality

Harvard University(哈佛大学)

Safwan Hossain, Yiling Chen

AI总结:

本文将数据市场建模为同时发博弈,考虑买家间负外部性,通过平台交易成本干预实现纯纳什均衡与强福利保证,并在动态学习估值设定下验证了低遗憾学习算法及

摘要:

我们将现实世界中的数据市场建模为同时发博弈,其中卖家发布固定价格,买家可以自由地从任何卖家集合购买数据。此处的关键组成部分是买家因数据购买而对彼此产生的负外部性。从买家预先知晓自身估值的简单设定出发,我们刻画了在此类外部性下纯纳什均衡的存在性与福利性质。尽管在无干预时结果黯淡,映射出当前数据市场的局限,我们证明对于标准类的外部性函数,平台通过交易成本干预可导向具有强福利保证的纯均衡。接着考虑买家通过市场交互随时间学习估值的更现实设定。我们的干预在此同样可行,并考虑学习算法以以实现个体与累计效用指标的低遗憾。最后分析了更丰富外部性模型下此干预的潜力。

英文摘要:

We model real-world data markets, where sellers post fixed prices and buyers are free to purchase from any set of sellers, as a simultaneous game. A key component here is the negative externality buyers induce on one another due to data purchases. Starting with a simple setting where buyers know their valuations a priori, we characterize both the existence and welfare properties of the pure Nash equilibrium in the presence of such externality. While the outcomes are bleak without any intervention, mirroring the limitations of current data markets, we prove that for a standard class of externality functions, platforms intervening through a transaction cost can lead to a pure equilibrium with strong welfare guarantees. We next consider a more realistic setting where buyers learn their valuations over time through market interactions. Our intervention is feasible here as well, and we consider learning algorithms to achieve low regret concerning both individual and cumulative utility metrics. Lastly, we analyze the promises of this intervention under a much richer externality model.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑