自动交通的有效拼车和通行费定价
Efficient Carpooling and Toll Pricing for Autonomous Transportation
摘要：
在本文中，我们讨论了由[Ostrovsky和Schwarz，2019]首次提出的自动拼车运输市场竞争均衡的存在性和计算。在均衡状态下，市场以社会最优的方式在交通网络上组织拼车旅行，并为个体乘客设定相应的支付和边缘的通行费价格。市场结果保证了个体理性、拼车出行稳定性、预算平衡和异质乘车偏好下的市场出清属性。我们表明，市场的存在性问题可以解决证明的线性规划问题的整数最优解的存在性。我们刻画了网络拓扑结构和乘客拼车的负效用条件，在此条件下，可以在多项式时间内计算市场均衡。这种特征依赖于组合拍卖理论和最小成本网络流问题的思想。最后，我们描述了一个市场均衡，实现战略性和最大化福利的个人车手。
英文摘要：
In this paper, we address the existence and computation of competitive equilibrium in the transportation market for autonomous carpooling first proposed by [Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2019]. At equilibrium, the market organizes carpooled trips over a transportation network in a socially optimal manner and sets the corresponding payments for individual riders and toll prices on edges. The market outcome ensures individual rationality, stability of carpooled trips, budget balance, and market clearing properties under heterogeneous rider preferences. We show that the question of market's existence can be resolved by proving the existence of an integer optimal solution of a linear programming problem. We characterize conditions on the network topology and riders' disutility for carpooling under which a market equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time. This characterization relies on ideas from the theory of combinatorial auctions and minimum cost network flow problem. Finally, we characterize a market equilibrium that achieves strategyproofness and maximizes welfare of individual riders.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
