arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2301.09306cs.GTcs.AI
收藏

削减家务:嫉妒与真相

Chore Cutting: Envy and Truth

Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur(印度理工学院卡拉格普尔分校)

Mohammad Azharuddin Sanpui

摘要:

研究了可分不良资源的公平分配问题,其中策略代理人可以操纵他们的私人信息以获得更好的分配。在一定的约束条件下,我们特别感兴趣的是,在分段常数估值上是否存在真实的无嫉妒机制。我们证明,没有确定性的真实的嫉妒自由机制可以存在于连接件的情况下,同样的不可能的结果发生饥饿的代理。我们还表明,没有确定性的,真实的独裁机制可以满足嫉妒的标准,同样的结果仍然适用于非浪费的约束,而不是独裁。我们进一步解决几个相关的问题和方向。

英文摘要:

We study the fair division of divisible bad resources with strategic agents who can manipulate their private information to get a better allocation. Within certain constraints, we are particularly interested in whether truthful envy-free mechanisms exist over piecewise-constant valuations. We demonstrate that no deterministic truthful envy-free mechanism can exist in the connected-piece scenario, and the same impossibility result occurs for hungry agents. We also show that no deterministic, truthful dictatorship mechanism can satisfy the envy-free criterion, and the same result remains true for non-wasteful constraints rather than dictatorship. We further address several related problems and directions.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑