arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2202.11930q-bio.PE
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随机支付多人对策中合作的平均距离

Average abundancy of cooperation in multi-player games with random payoffs

King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals(国王法赫德国王石油与矿产大学);University of Montreal(蒙特利尔大学)

Dhaker Kroumi, Sabin Lessard

摘要:

我们考虑的是玩家之间的互动,在规模为$d\geq2$的群体中,收益不仅取决于群体中使用的策略,而且随时间随机波动。个体可以选择合作或背叛作为策略,种群由一个生灭事件根据Moran模型从一个时间步更新到下一个时间步。假设经常性对称突变和预期值,方差和协方差相同的小顺序的回报,我们推导出一阶近似的平均丰度的合作选择突变平衡。我们发现,增加方差的任何回报的背叛或减少方差的任何回报的合作增加了合作的平均丰度。至于任何合作的收益和任何背叛的收益之间的协方差的影响,我们表明,它取决于与这些收益相关联的组中的合作者的数量。我们特别研究了公共物品博弈、猎鹿博弈和雪堆博弈,所有的社会困境都是基于合作的随机收益$b$和成本$c$。我们发现,在缩放方差的$b$或$c$,或在其缩放协方差的增加,使其更容易弱选择有利于丰富的合作,在雄鹿狩猎游戏和雪堆游戏。对于公共产品博弈,除了$b$的协方差对$C$的平均丰度没有影响外,同样的结论也成立。另一方面,增加比例突变率或群体大小可以增强或减轻弱选择的条件,以有利于$C$的丰度。

英文摘要:

We consider interactions between players in groups of size $d\geq2$ with payoffs that not only depend on the strategies used in the group but also fluctuate at random over time. An individual can adopt either cooperation or defection as strategy and the population is updated from one-time step to the next by a birth-death event according to a Moran model. Assuming recurrent symmetric mutation and payoffs with expected values, variances, and covariances of the same small order, we derive a first-order approximation of the average abundance of cooperation in the selection-mutation equilibrium. We show that increasing the variance of any payoff for defection or decreasing the variance of any payoff for cooperation increases the average abundance of cooperation. As for the effect of the covariance between any payoff for cooperation and any payoff for defection, we show that it depends on the number of cooperators in the group associated with these payoffs. We study in particular the public goods game, the stag hunt game, and the snowdrift game, all social dilemmas based on random benefit $b$ and cost $c$ for cooperation. We show that a decrease in the scaled variance of $b$ or $c$, or an increase in their scaled covariance, makes it easier for weak selection to favor the abundance of cooperation in the stag hunt game and the snowdrift game. The same conclusion holds for the public goods game except that the covariance of $b$ has no effect on the average abundance of $C$. On the other hand, increasing the scaled mutation rate or the group size can enhance or lessen the condition for weak selection to favor the abundance of $C$.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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