退出权为合作开辟了复杂的途径
Exit rights open complex pathways to cooperation
摘要：
我们研究了囚徒困境博弈的演化动力学，在这个博弈中，合作者和背叛者与另一种被称为退出者的参与者相互作用。而不是被利用的叛逃者，退出者退出游戏有利于一个小的回报。我们发现，这个简单的扩展游戏允许合作蓬勃发展，在良好的混合人口时，迭代或声誉增加。然而，在网络化的人群中，退出选择不利于合作。相反，它通过循环优势使合作者、背叛者和退出者共存。随着退出收益的增加或网络结构的变化，其他结果也是可能的，包括网络范围内参与者丰度的振荡，这可能导致退出者的灭绝和叛逃者的统治，尽管游戏参数应该有利于退出。在一个简单的退出游戏的选择之后出现的复杂动态意味着，即使我们的分析仅限于理性行为的激励，细微差别也很重要。
英文摘要：
We study the evolutionary dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma game in which cooperators and defectors interact with another actor type called exiters. Rather than being exploited by defectors, exiters exit the game in favour of a small payoff. We find that this simple extension of the game allows cooperation to flourish in well-mixed populations when iterations or reputation are added. In networked populations, however, the exit option is less conducive to cooperation. Instead, it enables the coexistence of cooperators, defectors, and exiters through cyclic dominance. Other outcomes are also possible as the exit payoff increases or the network structure changes, including network-wide oscillations in actor abundances that may cause the extinction of exiters and the domination of defectors, although game parameters should favour exiting. The complex dynamics that emerges in the wake of a simple option to exit the game implies that nuances matter even if our analyses are restricted to incentives for rational behaviour.
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