用公平的坚定策略超越勒索者
Outlearning Extortioners by Fair-minded Unbending Strategies
摘要：
最近的理论表明，勒索者利用零决定因素（ZD）策略可以单方面要求不公平的份额的收益在迭代囚徒困境。因此，建议对一个固定的勒索者，任何适应合作者应制服与充分合作，作为他们的最佳对策。相比之下，最近的实验表明，人类玩家往往出于公平的考虑而选择不接受勒索，实际上导致勒索者遭受比自己更多的损失。有鉴于此，我们在这里揭示了公平的策略，这些策略不会屈服于勒索，这样任何利润最大化的勒索者最终都会为了自己的利益而让步，在面对面的比赛中提供公平的分成。我们发现并描述了多个一般类的这种不弯曲的策略，包括慷慨的零决定性策略和赢留，输移作为特定的例子。当对固定的不屈的球员，勒索被迫与必然增加的损失时，打算要求更多的不公平的份额。我们的分析还枢轴的重要性，决定优势的零决定性策略，特别是他们的勒索能力的回报结构。我们表明，一个勒索ZD球员甚至可以胜过，例如，赢，留，输，转移，如果单方面合作的总收益小于相互背叛。不屈不挠的策略可以用来超越进化勒索者，并催化ZD玩家进化出以牙还牙的策略。我们的工作对促进公平和抵制勒索，以维护一个公正和合作的社会具有意义。
英文摘要：
Recent theory shows that extortioners taking advantage of the zero-determinant (ZD) strategy can unilaterally claim an unfair share of the payoffs in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. It is thus suggested that against a fixed extortioner, any adapting co-player should be subdued with full cooperation as their best response. In contrast, recent experiments demonstrate that human players often choose not to accede to extortion out of concern for fairness, actually causing extortioners to suffer more loss than themselves. In light of this, here we reveal fair-minded strategies that are unbending to extortion such that any payoff-maximizing extortioner ultimately will concede in their own interest by offering a fair split in head-to-head matches. We find and characterize multiple general classes of such unbending strategies, including generous zero-determinant strategies and Win-Stay, Lose-Shift as particular examples. When against fixed unbending players, extortioners are forced with consequentially increasing losses whenever intending to demand more unfair share. Our analysis also pivots to the importance of payoff structure in determining the superiority of zero-determinant strategies and in particular their extortion ability. We show that an extortionate ZD player can be even outperformed by, for example, Win-Stay Lose-Shift, if the total payoff of unilateral cooperation is smaller than that of mutual defection. Unbending strategies can be used to outlearn evolutionary extortioners and catalyze the evolution of Tit-for-Tat-like strategies out of ZD players. Our work has implications for promoting fairness and resisting extortion so as to uphold a just and cooperative society.
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