arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2106.08568cs.CR
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基于BPMN流程的自动化攻击模拟

Towards Automated Attack Simulations of BPMN-based Processes

Simon Hacks, Robert Lagerström, Daniel Ritter

摘要:

流程数字化和集成是企业日益增长的需求,而网络攻击则意味着日益增长的威胁。使用业务流程管理符号(BPMN)通常用于处理组织内部和跨组织的数字和集成重点。在同一家公司的其他部门,威胁建模和攻击图用于分析安全态势和弹性。在本文中,我们提出了一种新的方法来使用攻击图模拟在BPMN中表示的进程。我们的贡献是识别BPMN的攻击面,BPMN元素的概念映射在一个Meta攻击语言(MAL)为基础的领域特定语言(DSL),称为coreLang,和一个原型来展示我们的方法在一个案例研究中使用一个真实的发票集成过程。该研究表明,通过攻击图进行网络安全分析,可以在没有太多人类专家输入的情况下非侵入性地丰富BPMN实例。由此产生的对潜在漏洞的洞察可能对流程建模者有益。

英文摘要:

Process digitization and integration is an increasing need for enterprises, while cyber-attacks denote a growing threat. Using the Business Process Management Notation (BPMN) is common to handle the digital and integration focus within and across organizations. In other parts of the same companies, threat modeling and attack graphs are used for analyzing the security posture and resilience. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to use attack graph simulations on processes represented in BPMN. Our contributions are the identification of BPMN's attack surface, a mapping of BPMN elements to concepts in a Meta Attack Language (MAL)-based Domain-Specific Language (DSL), called coreLang, and a prototype to demonstrate our approach in a case study using a real-world invoice integration process. The study shows that non-invasively enriching BPMN instances with cybersecurity analysis through attack graphs is possible without much human expert input. The resulting insights into potential vulnerabilities could be beneficial for the process modelers.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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