arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2103.01452eess.SYcs.GTcs.SY
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电力市场需求响应管理下的社会效益优化--多时间尺度领导者跟踪方法

Social Profit Optimization with Demand Response Management in Electricity Market: A Multi-timescale Leader-following Approach

Jianzheng Wang, Yipeng Pang, Guoqiang Hu

摘要:

在电力市场中,市场参与者为获取自身最大利润而采取“自私”策略的现象十分普遍,这可能会造成社会利益的损失,影响社会的长期可持续发展。针对这一问题,本文将讨论如何通过战略需求响应(DR)管理来提高社会效益。具体而言,我们探讨了两种相互作用机制在市场上:纳什均衡(NE)和斯塔克伯格均衡(SE)之间的公用事业公司(UC)和用户UC的互动,分别。在用户侧,每个用户确定最优的能量购买策略,以最大化自己的利润。在UC方面,考虑了政府UC(g-UC),其目的是优化市场的社会利润。与此同时,正常的UC玩游戏,以最大限度地提高自己的利润。其结果是,一个基本的领导者以下的问题之间的UC制定下的独立系统运营商(ISO)的协调。此外,通过使用我们提出的需求函数改进(DFA)策略,制定了多时间尺度的领导者跟随问题。在这种情况下,可以在不改变普通用户契约的“自私本能”的前提下实现市场效率的最大化。此外,通过考虑用户合约的局部约束,提出了两种基于投影的用户合约定价算法,该算法能够为所得到的非凸社会利润优化问题提供近似最优解.在多UC多用户市场模型中引入无政府状态价格的概念,仿真验证了算法的可行性。

英文摘要:

In the electricity market, it is quite common that the market participants make "selfish" strategies to harvest the maximum profits for themselves, which may cause the social benefit loss and impair the sustainability of the society in the long term. Regarding this issue, in this work, we will discuss how the social profit can be improved through strategic demand response (DR) management. Specifically, we explore two interaction mechanisms in the market: Nash equilibrium (NE) and Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) among utility companies (UCs) and user-UC interactions, respectively. At the user side, each user determines the optimal energy-purchasing strategy to maximize its own profit. At the UC side, a governmental UC (g-UC) is considered, who aims to optimize the social profit of the market. Meanwhile, normal UCs play games to maximize their own profits. As a result, a basic leader-following problem among the UCs is formulated under the coordination of the independent system operator (ISO). Moreover, by using our proposed demand function amelioration (DFA) strategy, a multi-timescale leader-following problem is formulated. In this case, the maximal market efficiency can be achieved without changing the "selfish instinct" of normal UCs. In addition, by considering the local constraints for the UCs, two projection-based pricing algorithms are proposed for UCs, which can provide approximate optimal solutions for the resulting non-convex social profit optimization problems. The feasibility of the proposed algorithms is verified by using the concept of price of anarchy (PoA) in a multi-UC multi-user market model in the simulation.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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