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arXiv 2102.12423econ.GNq-fin.ECq-fin.MF
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碳排放市场的最优动态监管:一种变分方法

Optimal dynamic regulation of carbon emissions market: A variational approach

René Aïd, Sara Biagini

摘要:

我们考虑的问题,减少碳排放量的一组公司在有限的地平线。监管机构动态地将排放配额分配给每个公司。企业面临着特殊的以及共同的经济冲击的排放,并具有线性二次减排成本。企业可以交易配额,以最小化总预期成本,从减排和交易加上二次终端罚款。利用变分方法,我们展示了封闭形式的监管者的动态配置功能的市场均衡。然后,我们解决了监管机构和企业之间的Stackelberg博弈。再次,我们得到一个封闭形式的表达的动态分配政策,允许一个期望的预期减排。最优策略不是唯一的,而是具有共同的性质。令人惊讶的是,所有的最优政策诱导一个恒定的减排努力和一个恒定的价格津贴。由于调整成本和不确定性,特别是在存在共同冲击的情况下,动态分配的效果优于静态分配。我们的结果对一些扩展,如公司的风险厌恶或不同的惩罚函数是鲁棒的。

英文摘要:

We consider the problem of reducing the carbon emissions of a set of firms over a finite horizon. A regulator dynamically allocates emission allowances to each firm. Firms face idiosyncratic as well as common economic shocks on emissions, and have linear quadratic abatement costs. Firms can trade allowances so to minimise total expected costs, from abatement and trading plus a quadratic terminal penalty. Using variational methods, we exhibit in closed-form the market equilibrium in function of regulator's dynamic allocation. We then solve the Stackelberg game between the regulator and the firms. Again, we obtain a closed-form expression of the dynamic allocation policies that allow a desired expected emission reduction. Optimal policies are not unique but share common properties. Surprisingly, all optimal policies induce a constant abatement effort and a constant price of allowances. Dynamic allocations outperform static ones because of adjustment costs and uncertainty, in particular given the presence of common shocks. Our results are robust to some extensions, like risk aversion of firms or different penalty functions.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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