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arXiv 2105.00517econ.GNq-fin.EC
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北京车牌黑市

The Black Market for Beijing License Plates

Øystein Daljord, Guillaume Pouliot, Junji Xiao, Mandy Hu

摘要:

黑市可以通过将稀缺资源重新分配给最看重这些资源的消费者来减少扭曲性监管的影响。然而,黑市的非法性质造成了交易成本,减少了贸易收益。我们采用部分识别的方法来推断北京汽车牌照黑市的交易和交易成本的收益,这是在最近的配给之后出现的。我们发现,至少有11%的排放牌照是非法交易的。估计的交易成本表明存在严重的市场摩擦:61%至82%的已实现贸易收益因交易成本而损失。

英文摘要:

Black markets can reduce the effects of distortionary regulations by reallocating scarce resources toward consumers who value them most. The illegal nature of black markets, however, creates transaction costs that reduce the gains from trade. We take a partial identification approach to infer gains from trade and transaction costs in the black market for Beijing car license plates, which emerged following their recent rationing. We find that at least 11% of emitted license plates are illegally traded. The estimated transaction costs suggest severe market frictions: between 61% and 82% of the realized gains from trade are lost to transaction costs.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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