发表机构
Florida International University（佛罗里达国际大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
研究佛罗里达公寓市场如何应对连续冲击，用多期差异分析等方法，区分不同冲击后的资本化情况，发现价格因冲击显著下降，且不同建筑特征的资本化有差异，揭示市场通过不同渠道资本化风险和成本。
AI 中文摘要
住房市场会将有关未来风险和所有权成本的新信息资本化，但对于连续冲击本质不同时市场如何反应知之甚少。本研究考察佛罗里达公寓市场如何将两个时间相邻但不同的冲击资本化：瑟夫赛德公寓楼意外倒塌改变了对结构风险的认知，以及随后参议院法案4-D的颁布增加了预期未来所有权成本。利用2020年至2024年佛罗里达州超过100万笔公寓交易，采用三期差异分析设计，并辅以月度事件研究分析，以区分瑟夫赛德信息冲击后的初始资本化与参议院法案4-D后的后续资本化。瑟夫赛德倒塌后公寓销售价格大幅下降，参议院法案4-D后又出现了额外的显著下降。月度事件研究估计显示了与连续冲击密切对应的两个不同的价格调整阶段。异质性分析表明，资本化在建筑年龄和公寓价值方面系统地变化，但在沿海距离方面表现出相对较小且不太系统的变化。研究结果表明，住房市场通过不同的经济渠道将对未来风险的修正认知和预期未来所有权成本资本化。资本化的程度取决于每个连续冲击对买家先前评估的修正程度，而不仅仅取决于潜在的风险水平或所有权成本。
英文摘要
Housing markets capitalize new information about future risks and ownership costs, yet less is known about how capitalization evolves when closely sequenced information and regulatory shocks alter what markets had previously priced. This study examines Florida condominium market following the Surfside collapse and the subsequent enactment of Senate Bill 4-D (SB4D). Using statewide administrative condominium transaction data from 2020 to 2024, the analysis employs a common-treatment, three-period difference-in-differences design comparing condominiums in buildings inferred to meet the statutory three-story threshold with those in lower-rise buildings across the pre-Surfside, post-Surfside transition, and post-SB4D periods. The results show statistically significant, negative capitalization at the three-story threshold during the post-Surfside transition, with an estimated relative price decline of approximately 3.4% in the adjusted specification. Negative capitalization is significantly greater in the post-SB4D regime, reaching approximately 6.1%. Heterogeneity results further show greater post-SB4D negative capitalization among younger and higher-valued properties, with weaker evidence for properties closest to the coast. These patterns are consistent with capitalization reflecting revisions in perceived future user costs rather than the absolute level of those costs alone. A policy-anticipation analysis further divides the post-Surfside transition into an immediate post-collapse period and a pre-enactment period in which regulatory intervention was increasingly anticipated. Capitalization does not differ significantly between these two periods, suggesting that the greater negative capitalization in the post-SB4D period is less likely to reflect a progressively intensifying post-Surfside effect.
