完全偏好域上的高效与公平交易机制
Efficient and fair trading mechanisms on the full preference domain
AI总结：
本文将Yu和Zhang的交易机制方法扩展至允许无差异的完全偏好域，在保留效率与公平属性的同时，不依赖运筹学工具推广了房屋分配中的概率序列机制。
摘要：
Yu和Zhang（2025）引入了一种在市场设计中定义交易机制的新方法，并应用它开发了在各种模型中实现效率和公平的新机制。然而，他们对严格偏好的假设限制了其适用性。本文将他们的方法扩展到完全偏好域，允许无差异偏好，同时保留关键的效率和公平属性。作为推论，我们在不依赖运筹学工具的情况下，将房屋分配模型中的概率序列机制推广到完全偏好域。
英文摘要：
Yu and Zhang (2025) introduce a new method for defining trading mechanisms in market design and apply it to develop new mechanisms that achieve efficiency and fairness in various models. However, their assumption of strict preferences limits its applicability. This paper extends their approach to the full preference domain, allowing for indifferences while preserving key efficiency and fairness properties. As a corollary, we generalize the probabilistic serial mechanism in the house allocation model to the full preference domain without relying on operations research tools.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
