选票交易系统中的均衡与群体福利
Equilibria and Group Welfare in Vote Trading Systems
AI总结：
本文构建低信息下的选票交易博弈框架，求解 Nash 均衡并分析群体异质性，发现交易通常损害群体福利，同时扩展至全体选民交易并用真实偏好数据模拟验证。
摘要：
我们引入了一个新框架，用于研究当委员会中的选民被允许交易选票时的群体动态和博弈论考量。该模型通过在低信息环境中考虑以选票换选票的交易，代表了一项重要进展；在此环境中，选民并不了解其交易伙伴的偏好。所有选民从一个共同概率分布中抽取其在两个议题上的偏好强度，随后考虑向匿名伙伴提出交易。其结果是两名选民之间的一场策略博弈，并可进行解析研究。我们计算了该博弈的 Nash 均衡，并得出若干涉及对称性、群体异质性等方面的有趣结果。该框架使我们能够确定，交易通常会损害整个群体的福利，但也存在例外。我们还扩展了模型，允许所有选民交易选票，并为这一更一般情形推导了近似结果。最后，我们通过利用真实选民偏好强度数据构建模拟委员会，并计算由此产生的均衡及相关福利收益或损失，来模拟真实群体中的选票交易。
英文摘要：
We introduce a new framework to study the group dynamics and game-theoretic considerations when voters in a committee are allowed to trade votes. This model represents a significant step forward by considering vote-for-vote trades in a low-information environment where voters do not know the preferences of their trading partners. All voters draw their preference intensities on two issues from a common probability distribution and then consider offering to trade with an anonymous partner. The result is a strategic game between two voters that can be studied analytically. We compute the Nash equilibria for this game and derive several interesting results involving symmetry, group heterogeneity, and more. This framework allows us to determine that trades are typically detrimental to the welfare of the group as a whole, but there are exceptions. We also expand our model to allow all voters to trade votes and derive approximate results for this more general scenario. Finally, we emulate vote trading in real groups by forming simulated committees using real voter preference intensity data and computing the resulting equilibria and associated welfare gains or losses.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
