去中心化交易网络：均衡与公平性
Decentralized Trading Networks: Equilibria and Fairness
AI总结：
该研究探讨了去中心化交易网络中均衡与公平性的关系，证明了核心结果中代理的效用可能为零，并提供了动态交易网络稳定性的收敛结果。
摘要：
我们探讨了在双边合同的去中心化网络市场中稳定性与公平性的考虑因素，基于交易网络框架[Hatfield等人，2013]。在我们的交易网络博弈中，我们证明了一组明确定义的纳什均衡可以作为竞争均衡支持。考虑基于报价的交易动态以及随机价格时钟市场，我们证明了新的收敛结果，以纳什均衡和竞争均衡，为去中心化动态交易网络的稳定性特性提供了依据。转向公平性与（核心）稳定性的张力，我们证明了几个负面结果：非本质代理在任何核心结果中始终获得零效用，即使本质代理在所有核心结果中也可能获得零效用。
英文摘要：
We explore stability and fairness considerations in decentralized networked markets with bilateral contracts, building on the trading networks framework [Hatfield et al., 2013]. In our trading network game, we show that a well-defined subset of Nash equilibria can be supported as competitive equilibria. Considering an offer-based trading dynamic as well as a stochastic price clock market, we prove new convergence results to Nash equilibrium and competitive equilibrium, providing a rationale for stability properties in decentralized, dynamic trading networks. Turning to the tension between fairness and (core) stability, we prove several negative results: inessential agents always receive zero utility in any core outcome, and even essential agents can get zero utility in all core outcomes.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
