For decades, two-player (antagonistic) games on graphs have been a framework of choice for many important problems in theoretical computer science. A notorious one is controller synthesis, which can be rephrased through the game-theoretic metaphor as the quest for a winning strategy of the system in a game against its antagonistic environment. Depending on the specification, optimal strategies might be simple or quite complex, for example having to use (possibly infinite) memory. Hence, research strives to understand which settings allow for simple strategies.
In 2005, Gimbert and Zielonka provided a complete characterization of preference relations (a formal framework to model specifications and game objectives) that admit memoryless optimal strategies for both players. In the last fifteen years however, practical applications have driven the community toward games with complex or multiple objectives, where memory -- finite or infinite -- is almost always required. Despite much effort, the exact frontiers of the class of preference relations that admit finite-memory optimal strategies still elude us.
In this work, we establish a complete characterization of preference relations that admit optimal strategies using arena-independent finite memory, generalizing the work of Gimbert and Zielonka to the finite-memory case. We also prove an equivalent to their celebrated corollary of great practical interest: if both players have optimal (arena-independent-)finite-memory strategies in all one-player games, then it is also the case in all two-player games. Finally, we pinpoint the boundaries of our results with regard to the literature: our work completely covers the case of arena-independent memory (e.g., multiple parity objectives, lower- and upper-bounded energy objectives), and paves the way to the arena-dependent case (e.g., multiple lower-bounded energy objectives).
Infinite-duration games with disturbances extend the classical framework of infinite-duration games, which captures the reactive synthesis problem, with a discrete measure of resilience against non-antagonistic external influence. This concerns events where the observed system behavior differs from the intended one prescribed by the controller. For games played on finite arenas it is known that computing optimally resilient strategies only incurs a polynomial overhead over solving classical games. This paper studies safety games with disturbances played on infinite arenas induced by pushdown s…
We study two-player concurrent stochastic games on finite graphs, with Büchi and co-Büchi objectives. The goal of the first player is to maximize the probability of satisfying the given objective. Following Martin's determinacy theorem for Blackwell games, we know that such games have a value. Natural questions are then: does there exist an optimal strategy, that is, a strategy achieving the value of the game? what is the memory required for playing (almost-)optimally? The situation is rather simple to describe for turn-based games, where positional pure strategies suffice to play optimally in…
We study games with reachability objectives under energy constraints. We first prove that under strict energy constraints (either only lower-bound constraint or interval constraint), those games are LOGSPACE-equivalent to energy games with the same energy constraints but without reachability objective (i.e., for infinite runs). We then consider two kinds of relaxations of the upper-bound constraints (while keeping the lower-bound constraint strict): in the first one, called weak upper bound, the upper bound is absorbing, in the sense that it allows receiving more energy when the upper bound is…
Shortest-path games are two-player zero-sum games played on a graph equipped with integer weights. One player, that we call Min, wants to reach a target set of states while minimising the total weight, and the other one has an antagonistic objective. This combination of a qualitative reachability objective and a quantitative total-payoff objective is one of the simplest setting where Min needs memory (pseudo-polynomial in the weights) to play optimally. In this article, we aim at studying a tradeoff allowing Min to play at random, but using no memory. We show that Min can achieve the same opti…
Kopczyński (ICALP 2006) conjectured that prefix-independent half-positional winning conditions are closed under finite unions. We refute this conjecture over finite arenas. For that, we introduce a new class of prefix-independent bi-positional winning conditions called energy conditions over totally ordered groups. We give an example of two such conditions whose union is not half-positional. We also conjecture that every prefix-independent bi-positional winning condition coincides with some energy condition over a totally ordered group on periodic sequences.
University of Oxford（牛津大学）；University of Essex（埃塞克斯大学）
Recent results in the ML community have revealed that learning algorithms used to compute the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in a Stackelberg game, are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. Such a learning algorithm operates by querying the best responses or the payoffs of the follower, who consequently can deceive the algorithm by responding as if his payoffs were much different than what they actually are. For this strategic behavior to be successful, the main challenge faced by the follower is to pinpoint the payoffs that would make the learning algorithm compute a comm…
Recently, Dallal, Neider, and Tabuada studied a generalization of the classical game-theoretic model used in program synthesis, which additionally accounts for unmodeled intermittent disturbances. In this extended framework, one is interested in computing optimally resilient strategies, i.e., strategies that are resilient against as many disturbances as possible. Dallal, Neider, and Tabuada showed how to compute such strategies for safety specifications. In this work, we compute optimally resilient strategies for a much wider range of winning conditions and show that they do not require more m…
Learning to play optimally against any mixture over a diverse set of strategies is of important practical interests in competitive games. In this paper, we propose simplex-NeuPL that satisfies two desiderata simultaneously: i) learning a population of strategically diverse basis policies, represented by a single conditional network; ii) using the same network, learn best-responses to any mixture over the simplex of basis policies. We show that the resulting conditional policies incorporate prior information about their opponents effectively, enabling near optimal returns against arbitrary mixt…
We consider a two-player search game on a tree $T$. One vertex (unknown to the players) is randomly selected as the target. The players alternately guess vertices. If a guess $v$ is not the target, then both players are informed in which subtree of $T \smallsetminus v$ the target lies. The winner is the player who guesses the target. When both players play optimally, we show that each of them wins with probability approximately $1/2$. When one player plays optimally and the other plays randomly, we show that the player with the optimal strategy wins with probability between $9/16$ and $2/3$ (a…
The setting of the classic prophet inequality is as follows: a gambler is shown the probability distributions of $n$ independent, non-negative random variables with finite expectations. In their indexed order, a value is drawn from each distribution, and after every draw the gambler may choose to accept the value and end the game, or discard the value permanently and continue the game. What is the best performance that the gambler can achieve in comparison to a prophet who can always choose the highest value? Krengel, Sucheston, and Garling solved this problem in 1978, showing that there exist…
Two-player mean-payoff Stackelberg games are nonzero-sum infinite duration games played on a bi-weighted graph by Leader (Player 0) and Follower (Player 1). Such games are played sequentially: first, Leader announces her strategy, second, Follower chooses his best-response. If we cannot impose which best-response is chosen by Follower, we say that Follower, though strategic, is adversarial towards Leader. The maximal value that Leader can get in this nonzero-sum game is called the adversarial Stackelberg value (ASV) of the game. We study the robustness of strategies for Leader in these games a…
How can a system designer exploit system-level knowledge to derive incentives to optimally influence social behavior? The literature on network routing contains many results studying the application of monetary tolls to influence behavior and improve the efficiency of self-interested network traffic routing. These results typically fall into two categories: (1) optimal tolls which incentivize socially-optimal behavior for a known realization of the network and population, or (2) robust tolls which provably reduce congestion given uncertainty regarding networks and user types, but may fail to o…
This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a generalization of the Aumann et al. [1] two-player zero-sum one-sided incomplete information model. Under a correlated prior, the informed player faces the problem of how to optimally disclose information among two uninformed players in order to maximize his long-term average payoffs. Our objective is to understand the adverse effects of \information spillover" fr…
We investigate a phenomenon of "one-to-two-player lifting" in infinite-duration two-player games on graphs with zero-sum objectives. More specifically, let $C$ be a class of strategies. It turns out that in many cases, to show that all two-player games on graphs with a given payoff function are determined in $C$, it is sufficient to do so for one-player games. That is, in many cases the determinacy in $C$ can be "lifted" from one-player games to two-player games. Namely, Gimbert and Zielonka~(CONCUR 2005) have shown this for the class of positional strategies. Recently, Bouyer et al. (CONCUR 2…
