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arXiv 1907.01323cs.GT
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区间决策Shapley-Shubik指标的公理化

An Axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik Index for Interval Decisions

Sascha Kurz, Issofa Moyouwou, Hilaire Touyem

摘要:

Shapley-Shubik指数旨在评估委员会系统中的权力分布,绘制二元决策,是最成熟的权力指数之一。它被推广到输入和输出中具有两个以上批准级别的决策。在极限中,我们有一个连续的选择。对于这些游戏的区间决策,我们证明了公理化的权力措施,并表明,Shapley Shubik指数简单的游戏,以及$(j,k)$简单的游戏,发生作为一个特殊的离散化。这种关系和所述公理化与经典情况的密切程度表明,对于具有区间决策的博弈来说,可以使用Shapley-Shubik指数,它也可以推广到一个值。

英文摘要:

The Shapley-Shubik index was designed to evaluate the power distribution in committee systems drawing binary decisions and is one of the most established power indices. It was generalized to decisions with more than two levels of approval in the input and output. In the limit we have a continuum of options. For these games with interval decisions we prove an axiomatization of a power measure and show that the Shapley-Shubik index for simple games, as well as for $(j,k)$ simple games, occurs as a special discretization. This relation and the closeness of the stated axiomatization to the classical case suggests to speak of the Shapley-Shubik index for games with interval decisions, that can also be generalized to a value.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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