具有多个输入和输出认可度的对策的Shapley-Shubik幂指数的公理化
Axiomatizations for the Shapley-Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
摘要：
Shapley-Shubik指数是Shapley值的特殊化，广泛应用于评估委员会制定二元决策的权力分布。它被推广到在输入和输出中具有两个以上批准级别的决策。相应的博弈称为$(j,k)$简单博弈。在这里，我们提出了一个新的公理化的Shapley-Shubik指数为$(j,k)$简单的游戏，以及为连续的变种，这可能被认为是极限情况。
英文摘要：
The Shapley-Shubik index is a specialization of the Shapley value and is widely applied to evaluate the power distribution in committees drawing binary decisions. It was generalized to decisions with more than two levels of approval both in the input and the output. The corresponding games are called $(j,k)$ simple games. Here we present a new axiomatization for the Shapley-Shubik index for $(j,k)$ simple games as well as for a continuous variant, which may be considered as the limit case.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
