从顺序查询过程导出的功率度量
Power measures derived from the sequential query process
摘要：
我们研究了一个基本的序列模型，发现获胜的联盟在一个简单对策，众所周知，从它的使用定义Shapley-Shubik权力指数。我们在一个统一的方式得到了一个家庭的集体和个人的力量在简单对策的措施，并表明，作为Shapley-Shubik指数，他们自然扩展到TU-游戏的措施。特别地，各个度量包括所有加权半值。我们挑选出我们家族中最简单的措施进行更多的研究，因为据我们所知，这对文献来说是新的。虽然它与沙普利值有很大的不同，但它在几个方面是密切相关的，并且是在简单对策的非标准但自然的定义下沙普利值的自然模拟。我们通过在一些标准示例上计算其值来说明这个新度量。
英文摘要：
We study a basic sequential model for the discovery of winning coalitions in a simple game, well known from its use in defining the Shapley-Shubik power index. We derive in a uniform way a family of measures of collective and individual power in simple games, and show that, as for the Shapley-Shubik index, they extend naturally to measures for TU-games. In particular, the individual measures include all weighted semivalues. We single out the simplest measure in our family for more investigation, as it is new to the literature as far as we know. Although it is very different from the Shapley value, it is closely related in several ways, and is the natural analogue of the Shapley value under a nonstandard, but natural, definition of simple game. We illustrate this new measure by calculating its values on some standard examples.
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