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arXiv 1902.04336cs.CR
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攻击故障树的参数分析

Parametric analyses of attack-fault trees

Étienne André, Didier Lime, Mathias Ramparison, Mariëlle Stoelinga

摘要:

网络物理系统(如发电厂、联网设备和IT基础设施)的风险评估一直具有挑战性:安全性(即无意外故障)和安全性(即无攻击者造成的中断)是必须保证的条件。用于帮助考虑这些问题的传统工具之一是攻击树,这是一种基于树的形式主义,其灵感来自于故障树,一种用于安全工程的着名形式主义。在本文中,我们定义并实现了翻译的攻击故障树(AFT)的时间自动机,称为参数加权时间自动机的一个新的扩展。这使我们能够参数化常数,如时间和离散成本在AFT,然后使用模型检查器IMITATOR,计算参数值的集合,这样一个成功的攻击是可能的。使用计算的不同参数值集,可以根据攻击者的预算、时间或计算能力推断出不同的攻击和故障场景,从而为选择最有效的对策提供有用的数据。

英文摘要:

Risk assessment of cyber-physical systems, such as power plants, connected devices and IT-infrastructures has always been challenging: safety (i.e. absence of unintentional failures) and security (i.e. no disruptions due to attackers) are conditions that must be guaranteed. One of the traditional tools used to help considering these problems is attack trees, a tree-based formalism inspired by fault trees, a well-known formalism used in safety engineering. In this paper we define and implement the translation of attack-fault trees (AFTs) to a new extension of timed automata, called parametric weighted timed automata. This allows us to parametrize constants such as time and discrete costs in an AFT and then, using the model-checker IMITATOR, to compute the set of parameter values such that a successful attack is possible. Using the different sets of parameter values computed, different attack and fault scenarios can be deduced depending on the budget, time or computation power of the attacker, providing helpful data to select the most efficient counter-measure.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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