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arXiv 2409.07150cs.CR
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ZKFault：对基于零知识的后量子数字签名方案的故障攻击分析

ZKFault: Fault attack analysis on zero-knowledge based post-quantum digital signature schemes

Puja Mondal, Supriya Adhikary, Suparna Kundu, Angshuman Karmakar

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35 pages including appendix and bibliography
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AI总结：

本研究针对零知识框架的后量子编码签名方案，提出基于树结构组件的故障攻击，仅单次故障即可恢复LESS、CROSS完整私钥，并给出对应防护对策及效率分析。

摘要：

基于编码理论的计算困难问题（如伴随式译码问题）长期以来被用于构建安全密码方案，这类基于上述问题的方案也被认为能够抵御量子计算机的攻击。然而，由于密钥体积大、计算效率低，这类方案通常被认为不适合实际部署。在美国国家标准与技术研究院近期发起的后量子数字签名补充标准征集活动中，多个基于编码的候选方案被提出，其中包括LESS、CROSS和MEDS，这些方案均基于相对较新的零知识框架设计。尽管已有多项研究分析了这些方案的计算困难性，但几乎没有研究考察这类方案在物理攻击场景下的安全性。\n在本研究中，我们从故障攻击的角度分析了这些签名方案。所有这类方案都采用了类似的基于树的结构来压缩签名体积，我们针对方案的这一组件展开攻击，因此我们的攻击适用于所有上述方案。本研究中，我们首先分析了LESS签名方案并设计了对应的攻击方法，进一步说明了该攻击如何扩展应用于CROSS签名方案。我们的攻击基于非常简单的故障假设，结果表明，仅需单次故障，我们就可以恢复LESS和CROSS的完整私钥。最后，我们提出了多种防范这类攻击的对策，并讨论了这些对策的效率与不足。

英文摘要：

Computationally hard problems based on coding theory, such as the syndrome decoding problem, have been used for constructing secure cryptographic schemes for a long time. Schemes based on these problems are also assumed to be secure against quantum computers. However, these schemes are often considered impractical for real-world deployment due to large key sizes and inefficient computation time. In the recent call for standardization of additional post-quantum digital signatures by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, several code-based candidates have been proposed, including LESS, CROSS, and MEDS. These schemes are designed on the relatively new zero-knowledge framework. Although several works analyze the hardness of these schemes, there is hardly any work that examines the security of these schemes in the presence of physical attacks. In this work, we analyze these signature schemes from the perspective of fault attacks. All these schemes use a similar tree-based construction to compress the signature size. We attack this component of these schemes. Therefore, our attack is applicable to all of these schemes. In this work, we first analyze the LESS signature scheme and devise our attack. Furthermore, we showed how this attack can be extended to the CROSS signature scheme. Our attacks are built on very simple fault assumptions. Our results show that we can recover the entire secret key of LESS and CROSS using as little as a single fault. Finally, we propose various countermeasures to prevent these kinds of attacks and discuss their efficiency and shortcomings.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。

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