失败停止群签名方案
Fail-Stop Group Signature Scheme
摘要：
本文提出了一种失效停止的群签名方案（FSGSS）。FSGSS结合了群签名和失败停止签名的特点，提高了原群签名的安全级别。假设FSGSS遇到了一个拥有超级计算机的黑客的攻击，该方案可以证明数字签名确实是伪造的。基于上述目标，本文提出了三个引理，并证明了它们确实是可行的。首先，数字签名文件的接收人如何验证签名的真实性？第二，当一份经数码签署的文件有争议时，如有需要进行调查，小组经理如何找出签署该文件的原小组成员的身份？第三，我们如何证明签名确实是在超级计算机的外部攻击后伪造的？不久，在未来的论文中，我们将扩展这项工作，使该计划更加有效。在攻击之后，签名可以被证明是伪造的，而不需要暴露密钥。
英文摘要：
In this paper, we propose a Fail-Stop Group Signature Scheme (FSGSS). FSGSS combines the features of the Group Signature and the Fail-Stop Signature to enhance the security level of the original Group Signature. Assuming that the FSGSS encounters an attack by a hacker armed with a supercomputer, this scheme can prove that the digital signature is indeed forged. Based on the above objectives, this paper proposes three lemmas and proves that they are indeed feasible. First, how does a recipient of a digitally signed document verify the authenticity of the signature? Second, when a digitally signed document is under dispute, how can the group's manager find out the identity of the original group member who signed the document, if necessary for an investigation? Third, how can we prove that the signature is indeed forged following an external attack from a supercomputer? Soon, in a future paper, we will extend this work to make the scheme even more effective. Following an attack, the signature could be proved to be forged without the need to expose the key.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
