GIMLI失效故障的统计分析
Statistical Ineffective Fault Analysis of GIMLI
摘要：
无效故障分析（SIFA）是在CHES 2018上引入的一种攻击分组密码的新方法。从那时起，它们已被证明是一类强大的攻击，具有易于实现的故障模型。SIFA的主要好处之一是克服了基于检测和基于感染的对策。在本文中，我们解释了如何SIFA的原则可以应用到GIMLI，认证加密密码参加NIST-LWC竞争。在GIMLI的初始化阶段，我们确定了两种可能的子弹来发动我们的攻击。如果我们攻击第一个位置，我们能够唯一地恢复密钥的3个比特，并且使用每个偏置的单个中间比特180个无效故障来恢复组织在3个和中的8个密钥比特的奇偶校验。如果我们攻击第二个位置，我们能够唯一地恢复15位的密钥和22个密钥位的奇偶校验，这些密钥位被组织在7个和中，每个偏置中间位使用340个无效故障。此外，我们调查的故障模型的影响，在GIMLI的无效故障率。最后，我们通过仿真验证了我们的攻击的效率。
英文摘要：
Ineffective Fault Analysis (SIFA) was introduced as a new approach to attack block ciphers at CHES 2018. Since then, they have been proven to be a powerful class of attacks, with an easy to achieve fault model. One of the main benefits of SIFA is to overcome detection-based and infection-based countermeasures. In this paper we explain how the principles of SIFA can be applied to GIMLI, an authenticated encryption cipher participating the NIST-LWC competition. We identified two possible rounds during the intialization phase of GIMLI to mount our attack. If we attack the first location we are able to recover 3 bits of the key uniquely and the parity of 8 key-bits organized in 3 sums using 180 ineffective faults per biased single intermediate bit. If we attack the second location we are able to recover 15 bits of the key uniquely and the parity of 22 key-bits organized in 7 sums using 340 ineffective faults per biased intermediate bit. Furthermore, we investigated the influence of the fault model on the rate of ineffective faults in GIMLI. Finally, we verify the efficiency of our attacks by means of simulation.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
