再谈ICS中的异常检测:攻击与故障分离
Revisiting Anomaly Detection in ICS: Aimed at Segregation of Attacks and Faults
摘要:
在工业控制系统(ICS)中,其复杂的传感器、执行器和控制器网络已经引起了关键基础设施和工业生产单元的安全问题。这篇意见书试图对能够将攻击与故障分离的设计算法进行讨论。大多数提出的异常检测机制不能区分攻击和由于故障引起的异常。本文从CPS安全研究的经验出发,论证了解决这一重要问题的必要性。首先,我们从经济和心理两个方面,运用研究和访谈的分析方法进行激励。然后突出了主要挑战。此外,我们提出了多个方向的方法与合适的推理和ICS系统的例子。
英文摘要:
In an Industrial Control System (ICS), its complex network of sensors, actuators and controllers have raised security concerns for critical infrastructures and industrial production units. This opinion paper strives to initiate discussion on the design algorithms which can segregate attacks from faults. Most of the proposed anomaly detection mechanisms are not able to differentiate between an attack and an anomaly due to a fault. We argue on the need of solving this important problem form our experiences in CPS security research. First, we motivate using analysis of studies and interviews though economical and psychological aspects. Then main challenges are highlighted. Further, we propose multiple directions of approach with suitable reasoning and examples from ICS systems.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。