关于具有约束选择努力集的竞赛的注记
A note on contests with a constrained choice set of effort
摘要:
我们考虑一个对称的两个玩家的比赛,其中的选择集的努力是有约束的。我们应用支付函数的一个基本性质来证明,在标准假设下,纯策略中存在唯一的纳什均衡。它表明,所有的平衡点附近的无约束平衡。也许令人惊讶的是,当玩家有不同的奖品评价时,情况并非如此。
英文摘要:
We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. It is shown that all equilibria are near the unconstrained equilibrium. Perhaps surprisingly, this is not the case when players have different prize evaluations.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。