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arXiv 2404.02756econ.TH
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追逐竞赛

Chasing Contests

Zhuo Chen, Yun Liu

AI总结:

本文研究两名非对称参赛者完成两项突破的动态追逐竞赛,刻画公开与隐藏披露政策下的唯一x-启动与y-停止均衡,并揭示披露政策对停止时机和努力持续时间的差异化影响。

摘要:

本文提出了一种动态研究竞赛,即追逐竞赛,其中两名非对称参赛者付出高成本努力以完成两项突破。参赛者的非对称性体现在:其中一方具有现时偏向且已经完成一项突破(领先者),而另一方具有时间一致性,需要完成两项突破才能获胜(追逐者)。委托人可以在两种信息披露政策之间进行选择:立即公布追逐者的第一项突破(公开追逐竞赛),或仅公布最终结果(隐藏追逐竞赛)。我们在两种披露政策下刻画了唯一的x-启动与y-停止均衡,在该均衡中,领先者从某一时刻x开始工作直至结束,而追逐者在时刻y之前停止付出努力。此外,在隐藏追逐竞赛中,追逐者绝不会更早停止,而在公开竞赛中,较晚的截止期限会延长领先者的努力时间。

英文摘要:

This paper proposes a dynamic research contest, namely chasing contest, in which two asymmetric contestants exert costly effort to accomplish two breakthroughs. The contestants are asymmetric in that one of them is present-biased and has already achieved one breakthrough (the leader), whereas the other is time-consistent and needs to achieve two breakthroughs to win (the chaser). The principal can choose between two disclosure policies: immediately announcing the chaser's first breakthrough (public chasing contest) or announcing only the final result (hidden chasing contest). We characterize the unique x-start and y-stop equilibrium under both disclosure policies, in which the leader starts working from an instant x to the end while the chaser stops exerting effort by the instant y. In addition, the chaser will never stop earlier in the hidden chasing contest, whereas a late deadline extends the leader's effort in the public contest.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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