发表机构
Renmin University of China; National University of Singapore（中国人民大学; 新加坡国立大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
该研究分析多战场竞赛的均衡结构，证明了均衡存在性与一致性，明确不同战场数量下均衡的唯一性或多重性，并刻画了多数规则下的均衡特征。
AI 中文摘要
两个边际成本可能不同的参赛者在相同战场展开竞争，竞争由Tullock技术规则主导，其歧视性力量不超过1。对称方案根据胜利次数分配固定奖励。考虑弃权（不执行）、各战场间的非均等努力以及任意混合策略，我们证明了均衡的存在性与一致性。均衡可以是纯策略、半纯策略（一名参赛者混合策略）或双边混合策略；在双边混合均衡中，每名参赛者使用至多可数个正努力水平。具有不同结构的多重均衡可共存，同时产生相同的期望努力、奖励份额、成本和收益。对于每个可行方案和成本比例，当战场数量为6或更少时均衡是唯一的，而7个战场首次允许出现多重均衡或双边混合。我们还刻画了多数规则下的所有均衡。
英文摘要
Two contestants with possibly different marginal costs compete across identical battlefields governed by a Tullock technology with discriminatory power at most one. A symmetric schedule divides a fixed prize according to the number of victories. Allowing for inactivity, unequal efforts across battlefields, and arbitrary mixed strategies, we prove the existence and uniformity of equilibrium. Equilibrium may be pure, semi-pure (one contestant mixes), or two-sided mixed; in a two-sided mixed equilibrium, each contestant uses at most countably many positive effort levels. Multiple equilibria with different structures can coexist while generating the same expected effort, prize share, cost, and payoff. For every admissible schedule and cost ratio, equilibrium is unique with six or fewer battlefields, whereas seven first permits multiplicity or two-sided mixing. We also characterize all equilibria under majority rule.
Comments45 pages, 7 figures
