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arXiv 1611.08396cs.CR
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不能碰这个:实用和通用的软件防御Rowhammer攻击

CAn't Touch This: Practical and Generic Software-only Defenses Against Rowhammer Attacks

Ferdinand Brasser, Lucas Davi, David Gens, Christopher Liebchen, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi

摘要:

Rowhammer是一个硬件漏洞,可被利用来实现特权提升和远程代码执行攻击。以前关于Rowhammer缓解的建议要么需要硬件更改,要么遵循基于性能的方法(基于CPU性能计数器)。到目前为止,还没有针对遗留系统的Rowhammer攻击的即时保护。在本文中,我们提出了两个实用和有效的软件防御Rowhammer攻击的设计和实现。我们的防御可以防止攻击者利用Rowhammer破坏内存中由不同系统实体拥有的物理共存数据。我们的第一个防御,B-CATT,扩展了系统引导程序,以禁用易受攻击的物理内存。B-CATT非常实用,不需要更改操作系统,几乎可以部署在所有基于x86的系统上。虽然B-CATT能够阻止所有已知的Rowhammer攻击,但它还没有解决物理内存中缺少内存隔离的根本问题。为了解决这个问题,我们引入了我们的第二个防御G-CATT,这是一个通用的解决方案,它扩展了操作系统的物理内存分配器,以物理隔离不同系统实体的内存(例如,内核和用户空间)。作为概念验证,我们在x86上实现了B-CATT,并在x86和ARM上实现了我们的通用防御G-CATT,以减轻基于rowhammer的内核漏洞。我们广泛的评估表明,这两种缓解方案(i)可以停止可用的真实世界的rowhammer攻击,(ii)几乎没有强加运行时开销的共同用户和内核基准以及常用的应用程序,(iii)不影响整个系统的稳定性。

英文摘要:

Rowhammer is a hardware bug that can be exploited to implement privilege escalation and remote code execution attacks. Previous proposals on rowhammer mitigation either require hardware changes or follow heuristic-based approaches (based on CPU performance counters). To date, there exists no instant protection against rowhammer attacks on legacy systems. In this paper, we present the design and implementation of two practical and efficient software-only defenses against rowhammer attacks. Our defenses prevent the attacker from leveraging rowhammer to corrupt physically co-located data in memory that is owned by a different system entity. Our first defense, B-CATT, extends the system bootloader to disable vulnerable physical memory. B-CATT is highly practical, does not require changes to the operating system, and can be deployed on virtually all x86-based systems. While B-CATT is able to stop all known rowhammer attacks, it does not yet tackle the fundamental problem of missing memory isolation in physical memory. To address this problem, we introduce our second defense G-CATT, a generic solution that extends the physical memory allocator of the OS to physically isolate the memory of different system entities (e.g., kernel and user space). As proof of concept, we implemented B-CATT on x86, and our generic defense, G-CATT, on x86 and ARM to mitigate rowhammer-based kernel exploits. Our extensive evaluation shows that both mitigation schemes (i) can stop available real- world rowhammer attacks, (ii) impose virtually no run-time overhead for common user and kernel benchmarks as well as commonly used applications, and (iii) do not affect the stability of the overall system.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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