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arXiv 1802.07060cs.CR
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CATTmew:击败纯软件物理内核隔离

CATTmew: Defeating Software-only Physical Kernel Isolation

Yueqiang Cheng, Zhi Zhang, Surya Nepal, Zhi Wang

摘要:

所有最先进的Rowhammer攻击都可以打破MMU强制的域间隔离,因为每个域拥有的物理内存彼此相邻。为了减轻这些攻击,CATT引入的物理域隔离通过将物理内存划分为多个分区并保持每个分区仅由一个域占用来物理地分隔每个域。CATT实现了物理内核隔离,作为第一个通用和实用的纯软件防御,以保护内核免受攻击,因为内核是最有吸引力的目标之一。在本文中,我们开发了一种新的利用,可以有效地击败物理内核隔离,并获得root和内核权限。我们的漏洞可以在不耗尽页面缓存或系统内存的情况下工作,或者依赖于虚拟到物理地址映射的信息。该漏洞的动机是我们的关键观察,现代操作系统具有双重拥有的内核缓冲区(例如,视频缓冲区和SCSI通用缓冲区)同时由内核和用户域拥有。这种缓冲区的存在使物理内核隔离失效,并使基于rowhammer的攻击再次成为可能。现有的Rowhammer攻击主要是通过耗尽页面缓存甚至整个系统内存来实现根/内核权限升级。相反,我们提出了一种新的技术,命名为内存伏击。它能够将可锤击的双重拥有的内核缓冲区物理地放置在目标对象附近(例如,页表),只有少量的存储器。因此,我们的漏洞攻击更隐蔽,占用的内存更少。我们还取代了低效的rowhammer算法,盲目地拿起一个有效的地址锤。我们的算法选择合适的地址的基础上现有的定时通道。

英文摘要:

All the state-of-the-art rowhammer attacks can break the MMU-enforced inter-domain isolation because the physical memory owned by each domain is adjacent to each other. To mitigate these attacks, physical domain isolation, introduced by CATT, physically separates each domain by dividing the physical memory into multiple partitions and keeping each partition occupied by only one domain. CATT implemented physical kernel isolation as the first generic and practical software-only defense to protect kernel from being rowhammered as kernel is one of the most appealing targets. In this paper, we develop a novel exploit that could effectively defeat the physical kernel isolation and gain both root and kernel privileges. Our exploit can work without exhausting the page cache or the system memory, or relying on the information of the virtual-to-physical address mapping. The exploit is motivated by our key observation that the modern OSes have double-owned kernel buffers (e.g., video buffers and SCSI Generic buffers) owned concurrently by the kernel and user domains. The existence of such buffers invalidates the physical kernel isolation and makes the rowhammer-based attack possible again. Existing conspicuous rowhammer attacks achieving the root/kernel privilege escalation exhaust the page cache or even the whole system memory. Instead, we propose a new technique, named memory ambush. It is able to place the hammerable double-owned kernel buffers physically adjacent to the target objects (e.g., page tables) with only a small amount of memory. As a result, our exploit is stealthier and has fewer memory footprints. We also replace the inefficient rowhammer algorithm that blindly picks up addresses to hammer with an efficient one. Our algorithm selects suitable addresses based on an existing timing channel.

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