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arXiv 1707.05082cs.CRcs.OS
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对TrustZone的降级攻击

Downgrade Attack on TrustZone

Yue Chen, Yulong Zhang, Zhi Wang, Tao Wei

摘要:

安全关键任务需要与不受信任的软件进行适当的隔离。芯片制造商在其处理器中设计并包括可信执行环境(TEE),以保护这些任务。可信环境中软件的完整性和安全性依赖于系统的验证过程。我们发现一种形式的攻击,可以在目前广泛部署的ARM TrustZone技术的实现。该攻击利用了信任程序(TA)或TrustZone OS加载验证过程可能使用相同的验证密钥,并且可能缺乏跨版本的适当回滚保护的事实。如果漏洞在过期版本上有效,但在最新版本上修补了漏洞,攻击者仍然可以使用相同的漏洞通过将软件降级到可利用的旧版本来危害最新系统。我们在市场上流行的设备上做了实验,包括谷歌、三星和华为的设备,发现它们都有被攻击的风险。此外,我们还展示了一个利用高通QSEE的真实示例。此外,为了找出哪些设备图像共享相同的验证密钥,对不同厂商的模式匹配方案进行了分析和总结。

英文摘要:

Security-critical tasks require proper isolation from untrusted software. Chip manufacturers design and include trusted execution environments (TEEs) in their processors to secure these tasks. The integrity and security of the software in the trusted environment depend on the verification process of the system. We find a form of attack that can be performed on the current implementations of the widely deployed ARM TrustZone technology. The attack exploits the fact that the trustlet (TA) or TrustZone OS loading verification procedure may use the same verification key and may lack proper rollback prevention across versions. If an exploit works on an out-of-date version, but the vulnerability is patched on the latest version, an attacker can still use the same exploit to compromise the latest system by downgrading the software to an older and exploitable version. We did experiments on popular devices on the market including those from Google, Samsung and Huawei, and found that all of them have the risk of being attacked. Also, we show a real-world example to exploit Qualcomm's QSEE. In addition, in order to find out which device images share the same verification key, pattern matching schemes for different vendors are analyzed and summarized.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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