Nintendo Switch的安全性
Methodically Defeating Nintendo Switch Security
摘要:
我们一步一步地解释了我们如何从战略上规避Nintendo Switch的系统安全性,从基本的用户区代码执行,到破坏和暴露安全协处理器的秘密。为此,我们确定并使用了两种不同的分析程序。基于软件的分析足以对用户界面和操作系统服务进行逆向工程,并且对于Nintendo Switch中软件系统的一般架构理解是必要的。虽然这种方法是非常强大的,并提供了显着的杠杆作用的控制系统及其软件的安全性,设计了一个基于硬件的方法,它采用了可信的引导代码在ROM中的分析。这种策略是必不可少的目标,击败了硬件根的信任。这两个向量一起提供了实例化攻击链所需的基本见解,以便从运行系统的安全协处理器的高安全模式的上下文中获得ROP代码执行,从而使我们能够在不熟悉和新颖的环境中展示攻击安全嵌入式设备的多方面方法。
英文摘要:
We explain, step by step, how we strategically circumvented the Nintendo Switch's system security, from basic userland code execution, to undermining and exposing the secrets of the security co-processor. To this end, we've identified and utilized two distinct analysis procedures. The software-based analysis suffices for reverse-engineering the userland and operating system services, and is necessary for a general architectural understanding of the software systems in the Nintendo Switch. While this method is extremely powerful and provides significant leverage over the control of the system and its software security, a hardware-based method was devised, which employs analysis of the trusted bootstrap code in ROM. This strategy was essential for the goal of defeating the hardware root of trust. Together, these two vectors provide essential insight required to instance a chain of attacks, in order to gain ROP code execution from the context of a high-security mode of a secure co-processor of a running system, thus allowing us to demonstrate a multi-faceted approach on attacking secure, embedded devices in an unfamiliar and novel environment.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。