SPAM:应用程序内存的无状态置换
SPAM: Stateless Permutation of Application Memory
摘要:
在本文中,我们提出了应用程序内存(SPAM),软件防御,使细粒度的数据排列的C程序的无状态排列。主要好处包括抵御直接利用软件错误的攻击(即,空间和时间内存安全违规),以及利用硬件漏洞(如ColdBoot、RowHammer或硬件侧通道)使用单一内聚技术泄露或破坏内存的攻击。与以前的工作,垃圾邮件是无状态的设计,使其自动适用于多线程应用程序。我们将SPAM实现为LLVM编译器传递,并扩展到编译器-rt运行时。我们在SPEC2017基准测试套件的C子集和三个实际应用程序上对其进行了评估:Nginx Web服务器,Duktape Javascript解释器和WolfSSL加密库。我们进一步显示垃圾邮件的可扩展性,通过运行一个多线程的基准套件。SPAM具有更大的安全覆盖范围和与当代x86_64处理器上最先进的内存安全软件技术相当的性能开销。我们的安全评估证实了垃圾邮件的有效性,防止内/间空间/时间内存侵犯,使攻击者的成功机会低至1/16!
英文摘要:
In this paper, we propose the Stateless Permutation of Application Memory (SPAM), a software defense that enables fine-grained data permutation for C programs. The key benefits include resilience against attacks that directly exploit software errors (i.e., spatial and temporal memory safety violations) in addition to attacks that exploit hardware vulnerabilities such as ColdBoot, RowHammer or hardware side-channels to disclose or corrupt memory using a single cohesive technique. Unlike prior work, SPAM is stateless by design making it automatically applicable to multi-threaded applications. We implement SPAM as an LLVM compiler pass with an extension to the compiler-rt runtime. We evaluate it on the C subset of the SPEC2017 benchmark suite and three real-world applications: the Nginx web server, the Duktape Javascript interpreter, and the WolfSSL cryptographic library. We further show SPAM's scalability by running a multi-threaded benchmark suite. SPAM has greater security coverage and comparable performance overheads to state-of-the-art software techniques for memory safety on contemporary x86_64 processors. Our security evaluation confirms SPAM's effectiveness in preventing intra/inter spatial/temporal memory violations by making the attacker success chances as low as 1/16!.
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