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arXiv 1607.05699cs.GTcs.SI
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具有策略链路形成的随机传染病网络

Stochastic Epidemic Networks with Strategic Link Formation

Jie Xu

摘要:

了解网络中的级联故障或流行病对于为许多关键系统和基础设施(例如生物,社会和网络网络)开发有效的防御机制至关重要。大多数现有的作品对待网络拓扑结构是外生的,并研究在什么条件下的流行病爆发和/或消失。然而,如果代理人能够根据自己的自身利益战略性地决定他们的连接,网络反而会内生地形成和发展。在这样的系统中,流行病,代理人的战略决策和网络结构变得复杂耦合和共同进化。因此,现有的知识可能不再适用。建立了一个连续时间的强混合的易感-感染-易感传染病模型,研究了由策略代理人组成的随机传染病网络,策略代理人在仔细评估其当前可获得的收益和通过形成链接而导致的潜在未来成本的基础上,决定形成链接的数量.一个博弈理论框架来分析这样的网络,并获得了一些重要的见解。一个关键的结果是,如果在外生给定的网络中有效传播率足够低,那么流行病最终会消失,而当代理人具有策略性时,无论有效传播率如何,它都不会消失。该属性导致可实现的系统效率降低和显著不同的最佳保护机制。如果不了解代理的策略行为,可能会产生重大的安全成本。

英文摘要:

Understanding cascading failures or epidemics in networks is crucial for developing effective defensive mechanisms for many critical systems and infrastructures (e.g. biological, social and cyber networks). Most of the existing works treat the network topology as being exogenously given and study under what conditions an epidemic breaks out and/or extinguishes. However, if agents are able to strategically decide their connections according to their own self-interest, the network will instead be endogenously formed and evolving. In such systems, the epidemic, agents' strategic decisions and the network structure become complexly coupled and co-evolve. As a result, existing knowledge may no longer be applicable. Built on a continuous time Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible epidemic model with strong mixing, this paper studies stochastic epidemic networks consisting of strategic agents, who decide the number of links to form based on a careful evaluation of its current obtainable benefit and the potential future cost due to infection by forming links. A game theoretical framework is developed to analyze such networks and a number of important insights are obtained. One key result is that whereas an epidemic eventually dies out if the effective spreading rate is sufficiently low in exogenously given networks, it never dies out when agents are strategic regardless of the effective spreading rate. This property leads to reduced achievable system efficiency and considerably different optimal protection mechanisms. Without understanding the strategic behavior of agents, significant security cost may incur.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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