用瞬态动力学方法预防传染病传播
Prophylaxis of Epidemic Spreading with Transient Dynamics
摘要:
我们从规范的角度研究了网络中流行病传播的遏制问题。我们考虑一个易感/感染模型,代理可以投资,以减少网络链接的传染性。在这种情况下,我们研究社会效率,个人行为和网络结构之间的关系。首先,我们展示了一个上界的价格无政府状态,并证明了无效率的水平可以扩大到线性代理的数量。其次,我们证明了在广泛的网络中,一致减少相互作用的策略满足一些最优性条件。在设置没有中央政府可以执行这样严格的政策,我们认为作为一种次佳的政策,从本地到全球的游戏,允许代理人补贴在全球而不是在本地网络的传染性减少投资的转变。然后,我们通过自给自足的价格的概念,衡量全球和局部均衡的社会福利之间的比例,这些政策打开帕累托改进的范围。总体而言,我们的研究结果表明,面对流行病传播,个人行为可能效率极低,但政策可以利用网络结构来设计有效的遏制政策。
英文摘要:
We investigate the containment of epidemic spreading in networks from a normative point of view. We consider a susceptible/infected model in which agents can invest in order to reduce the contagiousness of network links. In this setting, we study the relationships between social efficiency, individual behaviours and network structure. First, we exhibit an upper bound on the Price of Anarchy and prove that the level of inefficiency can scale up to linearly with the number of agents. Second, we prove that policies of uniform reduction of interactions satisfy some optimality conditions in a vast range of networks. In setting where no central authority can enforce such stringent policies, we consider as a type of second-best policy the shift from a local to a global game by allowing agents to subsidise investments in contagiousness reduction in the global rather than in the local network. We then characterise the scope for Pareto improvement opened by such policies through a notion of Price of Autarky, measuring the ratio between social welfare at a global and a local equilibrium. Overall, our results show that individual behaviours can be extremely inefficient in the face of epidemic propagation but that policy can take advantage of the network structure to design efficient containment policies.
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