资源交易市场的双向拍卖机制
Double-Auction Mechanisms for Resource Trading Markets
摘要：
我们考虑一个双拍卖机制，这是最近提出的移动数据卸载市场的速率分配的背景下。网络运营商（用户）从将其流量卸载到第三方WiFi或毫微微蜂窝网络（链路供应商）中获益。链路供应商因其提供的额外容量而承受成本。用户和链接提供者（统称为代理人）的支付和成本函数作为私人知识。网络管理器将问题分解为网络问题和代理问题。代理支付和成本函数由代理人的出价调制。代理人的收益和成本由网络管理者设定的分配和价格决定。在这种设计下，只要代理人不预期他们的行为对网络管理者设定的价格的影响（即，价格接受代理），竞争均衡存在作为网络和代理问题的解决方案，并且该均衡优化所有代理的总效用。然而，这种设计失败时，代理商都是战略（价格预期）。具体来说，存在一个战略链接供应商驱动系统到一个不希望的平衡与零参与导致效率损失100%。这与早期的设置形成了鲜明的对比，在早期的设置中，只有用户是战略性的，而链路供应商不是-效率损失最多为34%。然后，本文提出了一个斯塔克伯格博弈修正，当用户的支付函数是线性时，效率损失可以用链路供应商的成本函数来表征。具体来说，当链路供应商的成本函数是二次的，最坏情况下的效率损失是25%。此外，对于更高次数的多项式成本函数，效率损失得到改善。
英文摘要：
We consider a double-auction mechanism, which was recently proposed in the context of rate allocation in mobile data-offloading markets. Network operators (users) derive benefit from offloading their traffic to third party WiFi or femtocell networks (link-suppliers). Link-suppliers experience costs for the additional capacity that they provide. Users and link-suppliers (collectively referred to as agents) have their pay-offs and cost functions as private knowledge. A network-manager decomposes the problem into a network problem and agent problems. The surrogate pay-offs and cost functions are modulated by the agents' bids. Agents' payoffs and costs are then determined by the allocations and prices set by the network-manager. Under this design, so long as the agents do not anticipate the effect of their actions on the prices set by the network-manager (i.e., price-taking agents), a competitive equilibrium exists as a solution to the network and agent problems, and this equilibrium optimizes the sum utility of all agents. However, this design fails when the agents are all strategic (price-anticipating). Specifically, the presence of a strategic link-supplier drives the system to an undesirable equilibrium with zero participation resulting in an efficiency loss of 100%. This is in stark contrast to an earlier setting where the users alone are strategic but the link-supplier is not - the efficiency loss is known to be at most 34%. The paper then proposes a Stackelberg game modification where the efficiency loss can be characterized in terms of the link-supplier's cost function when the users' pay-off functions are linear. Specifically, when the link-supplier's cost function is quadratic, the worst case efficiency loss is 25%. Further, the loss in efficiency improves for polynomial cost functions of higher degree.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
