First, this article considers the nature of quantum reality (the reality responsible for quantum phenomena) and the concept of realism (our ability to represent this reality) in quantum theory, in conjunction with the roles of locality, causality, and probability and statistics there. Second, it offers two interpretations of quantum mechanics, developed by the authors of this article, the second of which is also a different (from quantum mechanics) theory of quantum phenomena. Both of these interpretations are statistical. The first interpretation, by A. Plotnitsky, "the statistical Copenhagen interpretation," is nonrealist, insofar as the description or even conception of the nature of quantum objects and processes is precluded. The second, by A. Khrennikov, is ultimately realist, because it assumes that the quantum-mechanical level of reality is underlain by a deeper level of reality, described, in a realist fashion, by a model, based on the pre-quantum classical statistical field theory (PCSFT), the predictions of which reproduce those of quantum mechanics. Moreover, because the continuous fields considered in this model are transformed into discrete clicks of detectors, experimental outcomes in this model depend on the context of measurement in accordance with N. Bohr's interpretation and the statistical Copenhagen interpretation, which coincides with Bohr's interpretation in this regard.
On the Possibility of Quantum Informational Structural Realism
在2011年出版的《信息哲学》（The Philosophy of Information）一书中，卢西亚诺·弗洛里迪提出了一种存在的本体论理论，他称之为“信息结构实在论”，他说，这种理论适用于每一个可能的世界。他认为原始信息（“dedomena”）是任何可能世界中任何结构的基础。本文探讨了弗洛里迪对这一理论的辩护，以及他对“数字本体论”（有些人可能会混淆他自己的）的反驳。然后，以弗洛里迪的本体论为出发点，本文增加了量子特征的dedomena，为我们自己的宇宙，量子信息结构实在论，它提供了一个形而上学解释的关键量子现象，并减少了“怪异”或“幽灵”的量子力学的本体论理论。关键词：数字本体，dedomena，结构实在论，量子信息，原始量子比特
Realism and Ontology in Quantum Mechanics and String Theory
Stockholm University（斯德哥尔摩大学）；Nordita, KTH Royal Institute of Technology and Stockholm University（诺迪塔，皇家理工学院与斯德哥尔摩大学）；Basic Research Community for Physics e.V.（基础物理研究社区协会）
Subjectivists about Quantum Probabilities Should be Realists about Quantum States
有大量的文献，其中包括伊塔马尔·皮托夫斯基（Itamar Pitowksy）的《对测量结果的打赌》（Betting on Outcomes of Measurements），它揭示了量子力学的结构，以及量子力学与经典力学的不同之处，即通过将理论置于实验结果上的代理人的赌注中。虽然这种方法本身对于量子可观测量和量子态的本体论地位是中立的，但有些人，特别是那些采用“QBism”标签作为他们观点的人，认为这种方法提供了得出结论的动机，即量子态在物理现实中不代表任何东西，而是仅仅编码了代理人的信念。在本章中，我将论证，如果结论是关于行为者的信念的，那么当所涉及的概率被认为是主观的时，关于量子态的实在论的论证就通过了：一个信念符合量子概率的行为者应该相信，她与不同的纯量子态相关联的准备过程产生了不同的实在态。这个结论只能通过对行动者关于世界的理论化的限制的规定来避免，这些限制是量子力学的经验成功或任何其他经验考虑所不能保证的。量子概率的主观主义者应该是量子态的实在主义者。
