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arXiv 1205.2896physics.hist-ph
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认识论-科学实在论与不可证明的信念的本体关系

Epistemological-Scientific Realism and the Onto-Relationship of Inferentially Justified and Non-Inferentially Justified Beliefs

Max L. E. Andrews

摘要:

传统的知识观是一种有根据的真信念。当代认识论的主体主要集中在证明的任务上。真理似乎是一个相当明显的标准-我的论点是,本体论的方面与认识论分离得太远了。这种实在与信念之间的本体关系需要认识论实在论的认识方法。这并不是要减少称义的任务。然后,我将讨论从自由发明和发现的本体关系中推理的作用,以及它是否最适合于有神论语境中的基础主义或连贯主义模型。

英文摘要:

The traditional concept of knowledge is a justified true belief. The bulk of contemporary epistemology has focused primarily on that task of justification. Truth seems to be a quite obvious criterion-does the belief in question correspond to reality? My contention is that the aspect of ontology is far too separated from epistemology. This onto-relationship between reality and beliefs require the epistemic method of epistemological realism. This is not to diminish the task of justification. I will then discuss the role of inference from the onto-relationships of free invention and discovery and whether it is best suited for a foundationalist or coherentist model within a theistic context.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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